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ABSTRACT 
Tiantian Yang: How Do Organizations Shape Entrepreneurship? Explaining Employee 
Entrepreneurs’ Entry and Performance 
(Under the Direction of Howard Aldrich) 
            My three-essay dissertation consists of three independent chapters that examine how two 
major institutions, organizations and family, shape entrepreneurship in Sweden. In chapter one, I 
frame a contingent approach to social influence on entrepreneurship and empirically test the 
specifications about the contingencies. I first conceptualize entrepreneurship as a process of 
discovering and pursuing startup opportunities, I then theorize the conditions that amplify or 
reduce peer influence on entrepreneurship. In chapter two, I investigate the question of under 
what conditions spousal couples leave their wage jobs to become co-entrepreneurs. Whereas 
some spousal couples jointly create new business together, others may decide to have one person 
becoming an entrepreneur while the other person remaining employed in an established 
organization. I distinguish between competing theoretical accounts by investigating wives and 
husbands' transitions into entrepreneurship, taking into account their separate employment in the 
labor market and their joint household conditions. In chapter three, I investigate how founders 
and their recruited employees jointly create new businesses, contingent on the founding context 
of new businesses. I argue that an important dimension of developing routines and delineating 
boundaries is manifest in entrepreneurs' selections of employees from their local labor markets 
(Scott 2008). Once recruited, employees join the founders to
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create new organizations and exert influences on organizations' structures and 
performances. Even though entrepreneurs largely follow the blueprints they learned from 
prior employer organizations to recruit employees, the effects of transferring routines 
may be contingent on the founding conditions surrounding the new businesses. Tackling 
these research questions requires big data on founders’ employment history and their 
workplaces. I use a large-scale data set that are well-suited for my research questions, 
which are panel data from multiple cohorts on employer organizations and their 
employees in all industries in Sweden from 1989 to 2002.
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Process: Emergence and Evolution of New Firms in the Knowledge Intensive Economy” (EPRO) 
project, was created by scholars at the Stockholm School of Economics using publicly available 
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INTRODUCTION 
             My three-essay dissertation consists of three independent chapters that examine how two 
major institutions, organizations and family, shape entrepreneurship. Viewing entrepreneurs as 
organizational products (Freeman 1986; Stinchcombe 1965), contextual accounts of 
entrepreneurship have theorized work environments as one of the most important settings 
explaining individuals’ transitions to entrepreneurship (Dobrev and Barnett 2005; Sørensen 2007; 
Sørensen and Fassiotto 2011). Empirical findings have shown that the vast majority of 
entrepreneurs discover startup opportunities at their wage jobs in established organizations 
(Agarwal et al. 2004; Hellmann 2007; Klepper 2001; Klepper and Sleeper 2005). In addition to 
work environments, family is another social context in which most new businesses are founded. 
In post-industrial societies where profound social changes in labor market and employment have 
led to dramatic increases in dual-earner couples, family households have become increasingly 
important in shaping entrepreneurial processes (Curtis 1986; Western et al. 2008). Thus I 
examine the joint effects of work environments and family households on entrepreneurial 
processes – entrepreneurial entry and business outcomes.  
              In chapter one, I frame a contingent approach to social influence on entrepreneurship 
and empirically test the specifications about the contingencies. I first conceptualize 
entrepreneurship as a process of discovering and pursuing startup opportunities, I then theorize 
the conditions that amplify or reduce peer influence on entrepreneurship.  In studies of employee 
startups (employees leaving their employer firms to found new businesses), some researchers 
have noted the contagion of entrepreneurship among work peers, indicated by a larger likelihood 
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of employees’ transitions into entrepreneurship when they are surrounded by more work peers 
with startup experiences. The central argument is that social actors in workplaces influence 
potential entrepreneurs’ propensity to start new businesses by shaping their knowledge about 
startup opportunities and their attitudes about leaving their wage jobs to start new businesses 
(Kacperczyk 2012b; Nanda and Sørensen 2010). Preliminary results are in support of the peer-
influence argument on entrepreneurship: Analyzing a sample of Danish employees at risk of 
entering into entrepreneurship between 1990 and 1997, Nanda and Sørensen (2010) found that 
employees are more likely to become entrepreneurs if their coworkers have had prior self-
employment experience;  Based on data on hedge fund foundings between 1979 and 2006, 
Kacperczyk (2012b) found that past entrepreneurial behaviors of university peers are an 
important driver of individual rates of entrepreneurship. Similarly, Stuart and Ding (2006) found 
that individual academic scientists’ propensities to get involved in entrepreneurship depended on 
the extent to which their work settings included pro-entrepreneurship scientists. Although these 
studies support peer influence accounts of entrepreneurship, a deeper understanding of the 
mechanisms require an investigation of under what conditions former entrepreneurs affect their 
peers’ transitions into entrepreneurship.  
            The two conditions crucial for the occurrence of peer influence on entrepreneurship 
concern knowledge of and attitudes about entrepreneurship as individuals discover and evaluate 
startup opportunities. First, the degree to which knowledge shared by previous entrepreneurs 
fosters entrepreneurial entry among their peers may depend on whether their knowledge helps 
identify or/and evaluate startup opportunities in the workplace context. Second, whether previous 
entrepreneurs’ prior startup experiences encourage their peers to start new businesses may be 
dependent on if they help would-be entrepreneurs perceive the discovered opportunity to be 
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valuable. Thus I argue the industry-specific nature of knowledge about business and the biased 
perceptions of startup success serve as the conditions that moderate the magnitude of peer 
influence. 
             The chapter one of my dissertation offers a few implications for our understanding of 
entrepreneurship. First, where previous research has investigated the structural features of 
workplaces such as size and age, my analyses demonstrate that the percentage of employees who 
have pervious startup experience also explains workplaces’ capability of spawning 
entrepreneurial activities. Established organizations are important source of entrepreneurship in 
capitalist societies, partially because they make it possible for individuals to move between 
employment and entrepreneurship and they mix together individuals with various previous 
experiences. Second, given that established organizations serve as a setting for the occurrence of 
social contagion process of entrepreneurship among employees, organizational conditions that 
affect employee’s interaction and communication have crucial implication for the flow of 
information and ideas that might inspire entrepreneurial entry. Investigating such conditions 
requires rich information on the informal social groups within organizations and better data on 
the frequency of employees’ interaction. Third, my finding that former entrepreneurs’ previous 
failures do not discourage their work peers’ entrepreneurial activities reveals a possible 
mechanism that explains the high failure rate of entrepreneurship. It seems that individuals are 
not learning about the low life chances of startups from others’ previous failures and information 
about negative entrepreneurial experiences does not flow as much as positive ones. Future 
research may investigate whether feedback from others’ negative entrepreneurial experience can 
be more effective for learning about how to succeed in creating new businesses.      
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             In chapter two, I investigate the question of under what conditions spousal couples leave 
their wage jobs to become co-entrepreneurs. Whereas some spousal couples jointly create new 
business together, others may decide to have one person becoming an entrepreneur while the 
other person remaining employed in an established organization. Two theoretical models, one 
economic, the other sociological, have provided different explanations of the heterogeneity of 
spousal couples’ joint entrepreneurial statues.  
           The neoclassical economic model conceptualizes entrepreneurship as a process of 
discovering and pursuing startup opportunities. It posits that individuals acquire knowledge 
know-how to discover startup opportunities, and they are more likely to exploit opportunities if 
they can mobilize resources needed for achieving success (Agarwal et al. 2004; Franco and 
Filson 2006; Hellmann 2007; Shane 2003). In the process of discovering and pursuing startup 
opportunities, individuals are likely to recruit others when they receive informational or material 
support from potential team members. An implicit assumption of the neoclassical economic 
model is that discoveries and pursuit of startup opportunities are gender-neutral, i.e. 
universalistic with regard to gender. Accordingly, a spousal couple is likely to get involved in 
creating new businesses together if at least one of them has discovered a startup opportunity and 
the other person is capable of providing resource.  
However, the sociological literature suggests that the process of spousal couples’ 
transitions to co-entrepreneurship may be gender asymmetric. The first potential gender 
asymmetry may stem from the gender-biased perceptions of entrepreneurial opportunities 
discovered by men and women. Status expectation theory posits that social beliefs about gender 
imply hegemonic assumptions, leading individuals to discriminate (often unconsciously and 
automatically) against women by discounting their competencies at highly valued skills (Berger 
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et al. 1980; Ridgeway et al. 1994). Accordingly, a startup opportunity discovered by a man may 
be perceived as more promising, and thus worth his own effort and his wife’s time and resource. 
The second possible gender asymmetry in the process of co-entrepreneurship may be from 
family-embedded gender roles, male breadwinner and female homemaker roles (Brines 1994; 
Gorman 1999). Men and women’s self-fulfillment of their gender roles affect their propensities 
to exit their wage jobs to join their spouses in founding new businesses. Research has shown that 
women’s own wages are less predictive of their exits from the labor force than their husbands’ 
(Shafer 2011), in spite of women’s increased labor participation rates since the 1960s. The 
implication of these findings for spousal couples’ co-entrepreneurship is that even when startup 
opportunities discovered by men and women are equally valuable, women would be less likely to 
recruit their husbands as co-founders than men to recruit their wives because normative 
expectations presume the priority of men’s career choice and women’s support for their 
husbands’ careers.  
 I distinguish between the two competing theoretical accounts by investigating wives and 
husbands’ transitions into entrepreneurship, taking into account their separate employment in the 
labor market and their joint household conditions. To develop a theoretical model, I first identify 
the “lead entrepreneur” and the “follower” in a spousal couple by estimating each person’s 
propensity to entrepreneurial entry based on organizational conditions. These conditions include 
networks of work peers and the bureaucratic characteristics of employer organizations. I then 
theorize family household conditions – spousal couples’ comparative wage advantage and 
gender expectations associated with children – that affect spousal couples’ joint involvement in 
entrepreneurship.  
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             My results suggest that women’s chances to become entrepreneurs are constrained by 
their limited access to entrepreneurial peers at workplaces. Meanwhile, the differential effects of 
work peers on men and women’s exposures to information on and skills for creating startups are 
substantially moderated by family conditions. Three family conditions are particularly important: 
men’s dominance in spousal relationships, the relative comparative advantage of spousal couples’ 
earnings, and the presence of children in the households. My results show that family-embedded 
gender logic interacts with gender difference in social dynamics at workplaces in shaping gender 
inequality in entrepreneurship.    
            In chapter three, I investigate how founders and their recruited employees jointly create 
new businesses, contingent on the founding context of new businesses. I argue that an important 
dimension of developing routines and delineating boundaries is manifest in entrepreneurs’ 
selections of employees from their local labor markets (Scott 2008). Once recruited, employees 
join the founders to create new organizations and exert influences on organizations’ structures 
and performances. Even though entrepreneurs largely follow the blueprints they learned from 
prior employer organizations to recruit employees, the effects of transferring routines may be 
contingent on the founding conditions surrounding the new businesses.  
            During organizational emergence, routines lead to recurrent patterns of actions but also 
evolve from stable sequences of actors’ interactions (Becker 2004; Zollo and Winter 2002). The 
simultaneous process of developing routines for new businesses consists of two complementary 
stages: transferring routines from existing organizations and collectively enacting routines. At 
the first stage, entrepreneurs transfer routines from existing organizations to new firms (Phillips 
2002). They not only carry over knowledge regarding organizational structures but also transfer 
knowledge about what particular kinds of employees they should recruit. At the second stage, as 
	  	   7	  
new members are recruited to new businesses, routines are developed and reproduced as group 
members make collective efforts. Two properties of routines, one at each stage -- the 
incompleteness property of transferring routines and the collective nature of enacting routines -- 
are important for my theorizing of the conditions under which routines have positive effects on 
new firms. 
            Given the collective nature and context-dependent property of routines, the extent to 
which effective routines can be developed for new organizations is influenced by two conditions. 
The first set of conditions concerns the extent to which entrepreneurial founders recruit 
employees with whom they can collectively build and enact routines. From a learning 
perspective, routinization and implementation would be faster and easier when social actors have 
developed a common perspective, expectations, and approaches to problem solving from prior 
joint work experience (Beckman 2006). This argument leads to my first hypothesis regarding the 
positive effect of founders’ joint or similar work experience on developing routines effective for 
new firms’ performance. The second set of conditions concerns the extent to which members’ 
workplaces and the new firms are under somewhat homogeneous environments (Becker 2004; 
Hill and Hwang 2006; Kogut and Zander 1992; Kogut and Zander 1993). Nascent entrepreneurs 
benefit the most when they attempt to start businesses in industries where they already have a 
substantial depth of experience.  
             The national context for my study is Sweden. Sweden has been an exemplary corporatist 
society that has a long tradition of adopting public policies to rectify gender-stereotyped social 
roles for men and women (Furåker 2005). Since the 1970s, extensive family-friendly policies 
were adopted in Sweden to free women’s time from childcare, including extended parental 
leaves and government subsidies to families and day care centers (Moen 1989). However, 
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empirical evidence suggests that whereas there have been rapid increases in women’s 
employment in the labor market and dual-earner household families in Sweden, substantial 
gender gaps exist in earnings. With regard to the labor market, most previous research describes 
the Swedish labor market as flexible and dynamic. The Swedish labor market is comparable to 
the U.S. labor market in many aspects, including the level of employment protection, and the 
founding rates and failure rates of organizations. A noticeable difference is that social support 
from the Swedish Welfare State is stronger so that a smaller percentage of individuals would be 
“pushed” into entrepreneurship, i.e. becoming entrepreneurs because they had no better option. 
Another difference between the Swedish context and the American context for entrepreneurship 
is that people face fewer formal barriers in Sweden to entry into entrepreneurship. For example, 
less than 50% of American entrepreneurs have registered with government agencies or trade 
associations (Yang and Aldrich 2012), but nearly all Swedish entrepreneurs have registered with 
government agencies the first year when they founded their new businesses (Delmar and Shane 
2004; Shane and Delmar 2004).   
            The data I use for my analyses are taken from a database called Longitudinal Integration 
Database for Health Insurance and Labor Market Studies (LISA). This database has a number of 
features that makes it suitable for research on startups founded by people who were employees of 
established organizations. First, it has a wide coverage of individuals in Sweden: LISA presently 
holds annual registers since 1989 and includes all individuals 16 years of age and older that were 
registered in Sweden as of December 31 for each year. Second, LISA has rich information on 
labor market status, as it tracks the firm, industry, and region that an individual works in, as well 
as their employment status. In addition, the database has a variety of other individual 
characteristics that serve as important controls in studies of entrepreneurship (such as their age, 
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educational qualifications, annual income, wealth, marital status, and number of children). Third, 
LISA is longitudinal panel data that track employees from 1989 to 2002.  It allows me to 
examine the causal mechanisms that explain the process of individuals’ transitions into 
entrepreneurship, rather than just observing a snapshot of the phenomena or describing a 
correlation between entrepreneurship and explanatory factors. Finally, LISA is a matched 
employer-employee database, which allows me to identify which individuals work in same 
establishments. The matched employer-employee feature, combined with the panel data feature 
that track individuals’ career histories, makes it possible to examine how former entrepreneurs 
affect their work peers’ transitions into entrepreneurship.
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CHAPTER ONE: WHEN DO ENTREPRENEURS LEARN FROM WORK PEERS? A 
CONTINGENT APPROACH TO SOCIAL INFLUENCE 
             The significant contrast between voluminous entrepreneurial attempts and a low 
likelihood of startup success has led researchers to investigate the consequences of 
entrepreneurial processes for organizations and individuals (Aldrich and Yang 2012; Sorensen 
and Sorenson 2007). Theorists have noted that entrepreneurial processes – the foundings and 
dissolutions of new businesses – generate new populations of organizations and ensure the 
reproduction of existing populations (Aldrich and Ruef 2006; Hannan and Carroll 1992). As new 
organizations emerge, grow, and decline, they shape the opportunity structures facing employees 
(Carroll et al. 1992; Mamede 2009; Stovel and Savage 2006). Foundings create new jobs, while 
dissolutions destroy jobs. When former entrepreneurial founders move back to established 
organizations, they may affect the job mobility of employees working for the organizations to 
which the entrepreneurs return	   (White 1970). Many scholars have examined how returns of 
entrepreneurs to established workplaces affect current employees’ within-firm and between-firm 
job mobility (Haveman et al. 2009 ; Haveman and Cohen 1994; Stovel and Savage 2006), 
however, we need to know more about the mechanisms by which former entrepreneurs affect 
their work peers’ employment-to-entrepreneurship mobility. To the extent that individuals’ 
attitudes about startups and their propensities to undertake startup activities are affected by 
people who already have such experiences, entrepreneurial entry can be seen as an outcome of a 
social contagion process. The diffusion of social behaviors among peers has previously been 
investigated in sociological research (Cartwright 1965; Lippitt et al. 1952; March 1955). 
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            Empirical evidence has shown that individuals are affected by people with whom they 
share a social context (Friedkin and Cook 1990; Marsden and Friedkin 1993). For example, the 
happiness of Americans is affected by the income of those living nearby(Firebaugh and 
Schroeder 2009); High-school students’ college aspirations and attendance are affected by their 
friends (Hallinan and Williams 1990). Among the many kinds of behaviors occurring in social 
contexts, peer influence has found to be particularly salient in spreading behaviors that are 
viewed as deviant, including delinquency (Gardner and Steinberg 2005; Haynie and Osgood 
2005), drug use (Kaplan et al. 1984), and health-risk behaviors (Prinstein et al. 2001).  
Entrepreneurship – the act of founding a new business – is often seen as somewhat deviant 
because it is risky and full of uncertainty, as suggested by insights from organizational sociology 
and organizational theory. Scholars have coined many constructs to describe the precarious life 
chances of new businesses, including  liability of smallness  (Freeman et al. 1983), liability of 
newness (Stinchcombe 1965) and liability of disconnectedness (Powell et al. 1996) . 
Entrepreneurship theories share the insight that a big challenge facing entrepreneurs is how to 
cope with uncertain situations (Amit et al. 1990; Palich and Bagby 1995; Simon et al. 2000). 
These theories jointly suggest that entrepreneurial activities may occur as a result of social 
contagion among peers.   
             In studies of employee startups (employees leaving their employer firms to found new 
businesses), some researchers have noted the contagion of entrepreneurship among work peers, 
indicated by a larger likelihood of employees’ transitions into entrepreneurship when they are 
surrounded by more work peers with startup experiences. The central argument is that social 
actors in workplaces influence potential entrepreneurs’ propensity to start new businesses by 
shaping their knowledge about startup opportunities and their attitudes about leaving their wage 
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jobs to start new businesses (Kacperczyk 2012b; Nanda and Sørensen 2010). Preliminary results 
are in support of the peer-influence argument on entrepreneurship: Analyzing a sample of Danish 
employees at risk of entering into entrepreneurship between 1990 and 1997, Nanda and Sørensen 
(2010) found that employees are more likely to become entrepreneurs if their coworkers have 
had prior self-employment experience;  Based on data on hedge fund foundings between 1979 
and 2006, Kacperczyk (2012b) found that past entrepreneurial behaviors of university peers are 
an important driver of individual rates of entrepreneurship. Similarly, Stuart and Ding (2006) 
found that individual academic scientists’ propensities to get involved in entrepreneurship 
depended on the extent to which their work settings included pro-entrepreneurship scientists. 
Although these studies support peer influence accounts of entrepreneurship, a deeper 
understanding of the mechanisms require an investigation of under what conditions former 
entrepreneurs affect their peers’ transitions into entrepreneurship.  
             The two conditions crucial for the occurrence of peer influence on entrepreneurship 
concern knowledge of and attitudes about entrepreneurship as individuals discover and evaluate 
startup opportunities. First, the degree to which knowledge shared by previous entrepreneurs 
fosters entrepreneurial entry among their peers may depend on whether their knowledge helps 
identify or/and evaluate startup opportunities in the workplace context. Human capital theory 
maintains that compared to explicit knowledge codified in formal procedures or written 
documents, tacit knowledge -- know-how or the noncodified components of an activity -- is 
particularly useful for discovering (hidden) opportunities (Becker 1975; Polanyi 1966). But tacit 
knowledge about business is difficult to obtain and more specific with regard to the business 
setting. Research on entrepreneurship has suggested that tacit knowledge about new businesses is 
highly industry-specific (Agarwal et al. 2004), and is often cultivated via personal experience 
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and practical learning (Davidsson and Honig 2003; Polanyi 1966). Thus, former entrepreneurs 
would be more likely to contribute to the accumulation of their work peers’ tacit knowledge if 
they have had startup experience in relevant industries.        
             Second, whether previous entrepreneurs’ prior startup experiences encourage their peers 
to start new businesses may be dependent on if they help would-be entrepreneurs perceive the 
discovered opportunity to be valuable. Entrepreneurship scholars have argued that individuals 
are more willing to bear this risk and exploit opportunities when they (1) frame information more 
positively (Palich and Bagby 1995), or/and (2) perceive higher chances of success (Cooper et al. 
1988).  Because most startups fail, it is implausible that every entrepreneur’s experience would 
encourage others to do the same. Two conditions might affect the influence of former 
entrepreneurs on their peers: First, the extent to which their startup experience was positive; 
Second, individuals’ perceptions of others’ startup experiences. Previous research has found 
systematic differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, such as mangers of existing 
firms (Amit et al. 1990; Busenitz and Barney 1997). It shows that entrepreneurs are more likely 
than others to underestimate the risks, and even when the perceived risks are the same, they tend 
to overestimate the likelihood that their favored outcomes will occur (Forbes 2005; Zacharakis 
and Shepherd 2001). Opportunity perception- based explanations also suggested that 
entrepreneurs are more sensitive to successful events than to failures (Tversky and Kahneman 
1974). Thus an in-depth inquiry of peer influence on entrepreneurship needs to unpack how 
former entrepreneurs’ previous experiences affect their work peers’ perceptions of opportunity 
cost of pursuing startup activities.     
           In my study, I frame a contingent approach to social influence on entrepreneurship and 
empirically test the specifications about the contingencies. Building on previous studies, I 
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synthesize an entrepreneurial learning perspective and social influence theory to develop 
hypotheses. The empirical context for my analysis is the knowledge-intensive industries in 
Sweden. I conclude the paper by summarizing the key results and discuss implications from my 
study. 
THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES: A CONTINGENT APPROACH TO PEER 
INFLUENCE  
             Entrepreneurs are organizational products (Freeman 1986; Stinchcombe 1965). 
Contextual accounts of entrepreneurship have theorized work environments as one of the most 
important settings explaining individuals’ transitions to entrepreneurship (Dobrev and Barnett 
2005; Sørensen 2007; Sørensen and Fassiotto 2011). An agency perspective, developed by 
research on high-tech spinouts, emphasizes incumbents as technological environments in which 
potential employee entrepreneurs acquire technological know-how to discover startup 
opportunities (Agarwal et al. 2004; Franco and Filson 2006; Hellmann 2007). A learning or 
knowledge-based perspective posits that practical learning that takes place on the job is the key 
to employees’ access to knowledge about the industry and entrepreneurial opportunities 
(Elfenbein et al. 2010; Kacperczyk 2012a; Sørensen 2007). Consistent empirical findings have 
shown that the vast majority of entrepreneurs discover startup opportunities at their wage jobs in 
established organizations. For example, Cooper et al. (1989) found that 58% of the ventures 
founders viewed their prior jobs as the sources of their business ideas. Similarly, Bhide (1994; 
2000) found that about 70% of the founders he surveyed replicated or modified startup ideas that 
they encountered at previous jobs. Furthermore, research on spinouts also suggested that 
individuals working for existing organizations are more likely to recognize information about 
startup opportunities (Agarwal et al. 2004; Hellmann 2007; Klepper 2001; Klepper and Sleeper 
2005). Once opportunities are discovered, perspective entrepreneurs are more likely to exploit 
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opportunities if they can mobilize resources needed for achieving success (Cooper et al. 1989) . 
In sum, if knowledge and resources are central ingredients to create new businesses, work 
environments serve as the context in which prospective entrepreneurs assemble all the 
ingredients.  
            Workplace effects on entrepreneurship are a growing concern in the literature, and the 
role that work peers play in fostering startup activities by employees has received scholarly 
attention. Following Marsden and Friedkin (1993), I define social influence as the alteration of 
an actor’s behaviors attitudes as results of other actors with whom the focal actor shares a social 
context. The general hypothesis of social influence theory is that the occurrence of interpersonal 
influence between the actors leads to similar behaviors among peers (Cartwright 1965; Simon 
1957). In a situation involving ambiguity, people obtain normative guidance by comparing their 
attitudes with those of a reference group (Erickson 1988). “Attitudes are confirmed and 
reinforced when they are shared with the comparison group but alter when they are discrepant.” 
Applied in the context of entrepreneurship, the peer influence argument highlights the role of 
interpersonal influence among work peers on employees’ propensities to found new businesses 
(Ibarra and Andrews 1993; Stuart and Ding 2006).  
              I theorize peer influence on entrepreneurship within the framework that conceptualizes 
entrepreneurship as a process of discovering and pursuing startup opportunities. Thus my 
approach examines how previous startup experience by work peers affects employees’ 
discoveries and exploitation of opportunities. As depicted in the figure below, work peers’ 
startup knowledge helps the focal individuals discover startup opportunities and their previous 
startup experience also shapes the focal individuals’ assessment of their opportunity costs of 
pursuing startup opportunities. The industry-specific nature of knowledge about business and the 
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biased perceptions of startup success serve as the conditions that moderate the magnitude of peer 
influence. In the section below, I draw on entrepreneurial learning perspective and social 
influence theory to explain these contingencies and develop relevant hypotheses.  
 
Peer Influence Mechanisms at the Stage of Discovering Startup Opportunities  
             The degree to which knowledge shared by previous entrepreneurs increases their peers’ 
startup activities may depend on whether their knowledge helps identify or/and evaluate startup 
opportunities in the workplace context. Research on entrepreneurship has suggested that tacit 
knowledge --- that is particularly helpful to build the problem-solving “repertoire” of 
entrepreneurs -- is highly industry-specific (Agarwal et al. 2004). Thus, the contagion process of 
entrepreneurship among work peers is contingent on the mechanisms that govern the relationship 
between former entrepreneurs’ industry-specific knowledge and the sorting of their work peers 
into industries where they create new businesses.        
             Research studying employee startups suggests that employees working for incumbent 
firms are more likely to become entrepreneurs in the same industry because their career histories 
constrain the business know-how they obtain (Audia and Rider 2005; Klepper 2001; Klepper and 
Sleeper 2005). A knowledge-based perspective posits that an individual’s fitness or suitability 
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for becoming an entrepreneur is dependent on his/her knowledge learned from existing jobs 
(Jovanovic 1979). Because current employment is more likely to provide employees with 
technical and market knowledge about the incumbent firm, employees of incumbent firms will 
find themselves more suited for creating new businesses in the same industry (Chatterji et al. 
2013; Gompers et al. 2005). A genealogical approach of knowledge transfer also argues that 
knowledge inherited from established organizations would be most useful if employees start new 
businesses in the same industry (Phillips 2002). Accordingly, many scholars have anticipated 
that founders departing existing organizations constitute a significant proportion of the entrants 
(Stuart and Sorenson 2005). Among technology-based industries, empirical evidence consistent 
with this expectation has been found in automobiles (Klepper 2002), biotechnology (Stuart and 
Sorenson 2003a), microelectronics, and telecommunications. If individuals’ preferences for 
industries where they want to create new businesses are primarily shaped by their work 
experience, their own match of skills and the preferred industry, their propensity to start new 
businesses would only be amplified by their coworkers who had created startups in that specific 
industry. According to this argument, a strong correlation does not necessarily exist between the 
full range of industries where coworkers have created startups and the industries where the focal 
employees create startups. Instead, employees’ likelihood of becoming entrepreneurs would only 
be significantly affected by the share of coworkers having prior startup experience in the same 
industries.  
              An alternative argument is that knowledge about industries constitutes major 
components that former entrepreneurs share with their work peers. It assumes fewer constraints 
the current employment imposes on individuals’ learning opportunities and their preferences for 
industries. Compared to the argument made earlier, this alternative argument suggests a stronger 
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form of peer influence that includes shaping preferences for industries. According to this 
argument, I would observe a strong correlation between the industries where coworkers have 
created startups and the industries where the focal employees create startups. Thus, I propose and 
will test both the weaker form of peer influence and the stronger form of peer influence on 
entrepreneurial entry:  
H1. Weaker form of peer influence: Individual rates of entrepreneurship will be higher when a 
greater share of coworkers in work environments has prior entrepreneurial experiences in the 
same industry of the work environments. 
H2. Stronger form of peer influence: Individual rates of entrepreneurship will be higher in an 
industry where a greater share of coworkers in the work environments has prior entrepreneurial 
experiences in that specific industry where entrepreneurs choose to start their new businesses.  
Peer Influence Mechanisms at the Stage of Evaluating Startup Opportunities  
             Knowledge of the business alone, however, may not motivate an individual to pursue an 
entrepreneurial opportunity. Prospective entrepreneurs must also have a positive assessment of 
their chances to succeed in order to take actions to become entrepreneurs (Bandura 1986; 
Hackett 1995). Decision making regarding exploiting a startup opportunity involves weighing 
the value of the opportunity against the costs of forgoing alternative opportunities. An 
entrepreneurial entry is more likely to happen when the opportunity cost of launching a startup is 
lower (Amit et al. 1995). Entrepreneurship scholars have argued that individuals are more 
willing to bear this risk and exploit opportunities when they (1) frame information more 
positively (Palich and Bagby 1995), or/and (2) perceive higher chances of success (Cooper et al. 
1988).  Thus, in this section, I propose my hypotheses based on the mechanisms that govern the 
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flow of information on peers’ entrepreneurial experience and the mechanisms that shape 
prospective entrepreneurs’ perceptions of the information.    
Biased flow of information 
              The extent to which employees learn about their peers’ previous startup experience and 
obtain knowledge from them is dependent on the flow of information at workplaces. In her 
classic study, The Search for an Abortionist, Nancy Lee (1969) found that information about 
abortion services was surprisingly dispersed widely at the time when abortion was illegal. She 
argued that because of the unusual nature of the information, women were able to find 
abortionists even though these doctors were rare and they could not advertise their services. Her 
study suggested a biased flow of information among peers. A similar mechanism may also apply 
to the flow of information on entrepreneurship.  
            An important component of information on entrepreneurship is about a business’ 
outcome and/or the benefits for entrepreneurs. If information on peers’ positive entrepreneurial 
experiences spreads more widely than their negative experiences, the biased information flow 
may lead to systematic mistakes in prospective entrepreneurs’ evaluation of the attractiveness of 
the market and their chance to succeed. The widely celebrated success of entrepreneurship may 
encourage individuals who have more positive prior startup experience to share with others their 
stories (Aldrich and Yang 2012). This reasoning is consistent with the argument that knowledge 
is more likely to be shared if it is perceived to be useful for indirect learning (Argote 1999). 
Previous entrepreneurial founders may find their experiences valuable for their work peers and 
are more willing to share their knowledge. Furthermore, such positive information is also more 
likely to be repeated or paraphrased among peers during formal and informal conversations.  For 
example, an individual knowing of his peer’s previous startup success may talk to a co-worker 
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about the fortune that his peer has made from the startup. People may sense that they are 
expected to tell encouraging stories when talking to individuals who are interested in creating 
new businesses. Furthermore, in countries where the welfare states provide a safety net to 
individuals, failed experience outside of normal wage jobs is likely to be associated with shame 
and thus unlikely to be brought up in conversations (Jenkins et al. 2014; Wigren 2003). In other 
words, information about startup success may be more contagious than information about startup 
failure among work peers. This selective mechanism of information flow would lead to 
individuals’ greater exposure to their work peers’ positive prior experience than to their negative 
prior experience.   
Biased perceptions of information  
               In addition to biased flow of knowledge, biased interpretations of information may also 
lead to systematic mistakes in prospective entrepreneurs’ evaluation of their future success. 
Conventional models of the entrepreneurial process view entrepreneurs as rational decision 
makers and assume that they weigh the probability of startup success against the loss of leaving 
their wage jobs (Wiggins 1995). Such reasoning suggests that entrepreneurs willingly accept 
risks when the opportunity cost of pursuing startup opportunities is lower (Amit et al. 1990; Amit 
et al. 1995). Alternatively, others suggest that people are more likely to take risks when they 
perceive better chances of success and lower risks (Cooper et al. 1988; Kahneman and Lovallo 
1993). According to the alternative explanations, conditions under which evaluations of the 
opportunity cost occur may affect individuals’ probability of launching new businesses. 
Although individuals make rational calculations about the returns to their new businesses, their 
calculations depend on a subjective assessment of the local market and their individual chances 
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of success. As Sørensen and Sorenson (2003) commented, such a subjective assessment may be 
susceptible to psychological biases.  
            Optimistic overconfidence biases prospective entrepreneurs’ assessment of their chances 
of success, given what they learn about their work peers’ previous startup experiences.   
Studies from cognitive science define optimistic overconfidence bias as a tendency to 
overestimate the likelihood that one’s favored outcome will occur (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Such biases are particularly likely in situations where future 
outcomes are uncertain or ambiguous. Research on entrepreneurship has shown that individuals 
are more likely to become entrepreneurs if they are more susceptible to optimistic 
overconfidence bias (Forbes 2005). For example, Palich and Bagby (1995) found that 
entrepreneurs were more likely to categorize business situations positively than were managers 
of existing firms. Busenitz and Barney (1997) found that entrepreneurs exhibit a greater reliance 
on the overconfidence bias than did ordinary managers.   
            Work peers with successful startup experience contribute to prospective entrepreneurs’ 
over-confidence via two mechanisms. First, individuals may overestimate their probability of 
success when they learn that their peers have successfully founded new businesses before.  
Viewing entrepreneurial peers as role models, individuals may over react to successful foundings 
by thinking “If they can do it, I can do it too.” (Sorenson and Audia 2000: 443)  By 
overestimating chances of successes, prospective entrepreneurs may fail to notice the failed 
experiences that other peers have. In studying foundings in the television broadcasting industry, 
Sørensen and Sorenson (2003) suggested that nascent entrepreneurs seem far more sensitive to 
successful entries than to the failure of existing firms, even though they both provide information 
on attractiveness of the market (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Second, aggregated information 
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on multiple peers’ successful prior startup experiences leads individuals to believe that they are 
making a wise decision because they are collecting more information (Zacharakis and Shepherd 
2001). In other words, an inference made based on a large number clouds individuals’ cognitive 
thinking and makes them believe that their decisions about entrepreneurial entry are well 
informed. The second mechanism suggests that when a greater share of coworkers has successful 
prior entrepreneurial experiences, individuals tend to believe that their decisions to become 
entrepreneurs are based on sound reasoning, in spite of their acknowledgement of others’ failed 
experience. Given the arguments above, I propose that:  
H3. Sensitivity to successes: Individual rates of entrepreneurship will be higher when a greater 
share of coworkers in work environments has successful prior entrepreneurial experiences.  
H4. Insensitivity to failures: Unsuccessful prior entrepreneurial experiences by coworkers in 
work environment do not reduce individual rates of entrepreneurship.   
METHOD 
Data 
              The data I use for my analyses are taken from a database called Longitudinal Integration 
Database for Health Insurance and Labor Market Studies (LISA). This database has a number of 
features that makes it suitable for research on entrepreneurial entry. First, it has a wide coverage 
of individuals in Sweden: LISA presently holds annual registers since 1989 and includes all 
individuals 16 years of age and older that were registered in Sweden as of December 31 for each 
year.  
            Second, LISA has rich information on labor market status, as it tracks the firm, industry, 
and region that an individual works in, as well as their employment status. In addition, the 
database has a variety of other individual characteristics that serve as important controls in 
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studies of entrepreneurship (such as their age, educational qualifications, annual income, wealth, 
marital status, and number of children).  
           Third, LISA is longitudinal panel data that track employees from 1989 to 2002.  It allows 
me to examine the causal mechanisms that explain the process of individuals’ transitions into 
entrepreneurship, rather than just observing a snapshot of the phenomena or describing a 
correlation between entrepreneurship and explanatory factors. 
           Finally, LISA is a matched employer-employee database, which allows me to identify 
which individuals work in same establishments. The matched employer-employee feature, 
combined with the panel data feature that track individuals’ career histories, makes it possible to 
examine how former entrepreneurs affect their work peers’ transitions into entrepreneurship. 
Sample 
             I construct the sample for my analysis based on LISA. The research design for my study 
must allow for an observation of individual career histories prior to current employment in 
established organizations, and an observation of (some) employees’ transitions into 
entrepreneurship. With regard to the observation of prior career histories, the earliest possible 
year is 1989. With regard to the observation of the event of interest (an employee’s probability of 
transitioning from current employment to entrepreneurship), the initial time of being at risk 
should be the first year when an individual is newly hired by an employer. Because I want to 
trace employees back five years from the current employment, I choose 1994 as the earliest 
possible initial year of being at risk for occurrence of entrepreneurship. Because I want to follow 
employees for long enough to reduce right-censoring, I choose 1997 as the latest possible initial 
year of being at risk for occurrence of entrepreneurship. These decisions lead to a sample of 4 
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cohorts of employees (1994 or before, 1995, 1996, and 1997) who are at risk of entering into 
entrepreneurship between 1994 and 2002.  
             However, not every employee started their current employment in 1994. Some started 
prior to 1994 and others started after 1994.If a firm is created in 1989 or before, I won’t be able 
to identify the first year when an individual was hired. If a firm is created in a year between 1990 
and 2002, the first year of employment is identifiable for individuals hired before the end of the 
observation, the year of 2002. Because I choose 1994 as the earliest possible initial year of being 
at risk for occurrence of entrepreneurship, the data are left-truncated when they include 
individuals for whom the observation period starts after the first year of employment in a firm. 
These individuals are employees hired by firms founded in 1989 or before (presumably these 
firms were founded in 1989 to before). Some researchers have taken a more conservative 
approach to handle left-truncation by only including individuals who started their jobs in the first 
year of their observation period. For example, Nanda and Sorensen (2010) limited the sample to 
individuals who were newly hired with their employer in 1990 and 1990 is the first year of the 
observation. Given the descriptive result shown in table 1 in Appendix 1, the percentage of 
employees started their jobs in 1994 is 4.8%, 5.7%, 7.1%, 7.6% 13.5%, and 35.3% for firms 
founded in 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994, respectively. Only including people who 
were newly hired in a given year would lead to a very restricted sample. Because knowing the 
initial time of being at risk of entering into entrepreneurship allows me to control for left-
truncation, I choose a more inclusive sample by including employees whose first year of 
employment is from 1990 onwards. Among the 9,998,235 individuals of the original sample, 
only 3% would be excluded from the final sample for my analysis.    
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            The figure below describes the research design of this study. 
             
               The unit of workplace for my study is an establishment rather than an organization 
because the distribution of firm size is highly left skewed and large firms usually have 
establishments at multiple locations. Because peer influence likely happens when individuals are 
physically located in same place, an establishment is a more appropriate unit than a firm. Among 
establishments, I restricted the final sample to only include establishments that have less than 50 
employees in their founding year, and I treat employees as right censored when their 
establishments grow larger and hire more than 100 employees. I excluded large establishments, 
about 10% of establishments in the sample, from my analysis because previous research has 
shown that small firms are more likely to spawn entrepreneurship (Elfenbein et al. 2010; 
Sørensen 2007). So the sample of small workplaces is a relevant sample for my analysis on 
entrepreneurial entry. Furthermore, because the data do not directly identify how frequently the 
focal individual comes into contact with a particular coworker in the workplace, restricting 
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establishments to small ones makes it plausible that individuals in small establishments have 
interaction with each other.  
Dependent Variable 
             I follow previous research using similar datasets to measure transitions to 
entrepreneurship relying on a work status classification scheme that differentiates a variety of 
labor force attachments: (1) employment with established organizations, (2) unemployment, (3) 
not in the labor force, and (4) self-employment. Statistics Sweden recognizes both 
unincorporated self-employment and incorporated self-employment.1 Founders of incorporated 
ventures appeared as employees whereas the incorporated ventures appeared as employers. 
However, I treated individuals who were founders of incorporated ventures as entrepreneurs, 
self-employed in incorporated firms. Furthermore, following Sørensen (2007), I define 
entrepreneurs based on the size of employees in the founding year of a new business and a direct 
transition from employment to entrepreneurship. First, I assume that individuals who are self-
employed in newly founded firms are entrepreneurs. Second, if an individual becomes 
unemployed between employment in one year and self-employment in the next, I do not identify 
it as transition from employment into entrepreneurship. Unlike Nanda and Sørensen (2010) 
treating employees working for new firms that have less than 3 employees as entrepreneurs, I 
only define self-employed people as entrepreneurs because the jobs that employees have in 
newly founded small firms are still wage jobs, which are fundamentally different than founding 
one’s own new business.              
Independent Variables 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The data is based both on the statement of income to be provided to tax authorities for all 
persons who received remuneration or other benefits from employers and the data on declared 
income of active trade.  
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            Prior entrepreneurial experience of the focal individual’s Coworkers: is measured by two 
indicators. (1) To construct the first indicator, I first identify the number of years each of the 
focal individual’s colleagues had been self-employed in the preceding five years. As Nanda and 
Sørensen (2010) have argued, “the choice of a five-year window is somewhat arbitrary, but 
reflects an assumption that the impact of entrepreneurial experience declines with time.” I then 
calculate the average number of years (of the previous five years) the focal individual’s peers 
were entrepreneurs. (2) The alternative indicator is the number of the focal individual’s 
colleagues who had ever been self-employed in the preceding five years. Whereas the first 
indicator emphasizes the extent of entrepreneurial experience that co-workers had in the past five 
years, the alternative measure emphasizes the intensity of peer network ties with prior 
entrepreneurial experience.  
          Industry-specific experience: The data include 5-digit industry codes. I code the variable -- 
the number of years each of the focal individual’s colleagues had been self-employed in the 
preceding five years for each 5 digit industry code.  
          Similarity of industry: this variable is coded based on the 5-digit SIC industry code. There 
are three industries of my interest: the industry where a former entrepreneur created his/her 
startup, the industry where the current workplace is established, and the industry where an 
employee starts his/her new business. I examine the similarity of any pair of the three industries, 
which is measured by an ordinal variable ranged from 0 to 5, indicating whether the two 
businesses are in same industry in the 1st, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, or 1-5 industry code. For example, the 
extent of similarity of the two industry codes, 50202 and 50203 (50202 Bodywork repair, 
painting and glazing of motor vehicles, 50203 Installation and repair of electrical motor vehicle 
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equipment ) would be 4; and the extent of similarity of the two industry codes 50202 and 50301 
(Wholesale of motor vehicle parts and accessories) would be 2.  
            Indicators of a startup outcome for a former entrepreneur prior to current employment: 
First: Z score of entrepreneurial income in the same industry and region: is the number of 
standard deviations an entrepreneur’s personal income is above or below the average income of 
entrepreneurs in the same industry and same region. It indicates the relative personal 
achievement of an entrepreneur compared to the reference group: other entrepreneurs in the same 
industry and region. Presumably, an entrepreneur would have a more positive startup experience 
if he/she had more income from his/her startup compared to other entrepreneurs. This measure 
controls for region and industry because entrepreneurial income is highly dependent on industry 
and region so controlling for the two factors can reduce heterogeneity; The unit of an industry is 
a 5-digit level, and the unit of a region is a county. I choose a county instead of a municipality as 
the unit for a region because Swedish municipalities are very small. Sweden has 290 
municipalities. The average population of a municipality is 31,930, and the median population is 
15,257, the average population density (people/km^2) is 132, and the median density is only 26. 
Given that roughly 60% of Swedish population is in the labor force, 2 and 3.5% of the labor force 
is involved in entrepreneurship, 3 the number of entrepreneurship in an industry at 5-digit 
industry code level would be extremely small. So county is a more reasonable regional unit for 
my analysis. Sweden has 21 counties. The average population size of a Swedish county is 
450,634, and the average density of population is 46. Defining a county as the region and a 5-
digit industry code as the industry, the average number of entrepreneurs in each industry-region 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 http://www.bls.gov/fls/country/sweden.htm 
3 http://www.gemconsortium.org/docs/download/2409	  
	  29	  
	  
is 26, and the median is 5. Second, an alternative indicator is the ratio of a former entrepreneur’s 
current wage salary to his/her income from his/her new business in the year where he/she leaves 
the new business. I assume that a former entrepreneur has a more positive experience if he/she 
had more income from his/her startup than the current wage job. Both of the two indicators affect 
former entrepreneurs’ perceptions of their previous startup experience and thus influence the way 
they shape work peers’ potential entrepreneurial activities.  
Control variables 
           Individual level control variables:  
            The data have two measures for education that can be converted to each other: First, the 
level of education: Six levels: (1) Compulsory schooling less than 9 years; (2) Compulsory 
schooling nine years (equivalent); (3) Secondary education; (4) Post-secondary education less 
than two years; (5) Post-secondary education two years or longer; (6) Graduate program. Second: 
years of education. Statistical Sweden and Swedish Council for Higher Education calculated 
years of education for each education code, which consists of information on the level of 
education and the type of education. I use years of education because it is more fine-grained 
measure than the level of education. 
           Severn other individual-level control variables are (1) age and age squared; (2) whether an 
individual received the highest degree in a university in Stockholm; (3) days of unemployment in 
a year; (4) gender; (5) whether an individual has created business before (a serial entrepreneur); 
(6) individual wage income; (7) fixed effects for the year when an employee was hired by the 
current employment. 
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           Firm-level control variables: the natural logarithm of the number of employees, average 
salaries of employees, the percentage of female employees; whether a firm has any currently 
self-employed people; the year when a firm was founded; County fixed effects. 
 Analytical Strategy  
           I use proportional hazard model to test hypotheses. The hazard rate of interest is the 
instantaneous rate of transitioning into entrepreneurship, or conditional transition rate, written as: 
λ t = lim∆!→! ! !!!!!!∆!|!!!∆! = lim∆!→! ! !!!!!!∆!,      !!!∆!! !!! = lim∆!→! ! !!!!!!∆!∆!! !!! = ƒ !! !  
The formula indicates that the hazard rate is the ratio of the probability density function to the 
survival function, meaning the approximate probability that an employee becomes an 
entrepreneur between the time interval [t, t +∆𝑡 ], conditional on its probability of staying on the 
wage job to time t. 
            In my analysis, I am aware of potential methodological problems related to research 
design and data collection that may bias model estimation: left-truncation and right-censoring. 
Both left-truncation and right-censoring lead to incomplete panel data (Guo 1993). Left 
truncation occurs when employees had already been exposed to the risk of transitioning into 
entrepreneurship for a certain period (depending on when they started) when they came under the 
observation. In other words, a time lag exists between the initial year of employment and the 
beginning point of our observation. To formally define left truncation, let iT be a continuous 
variable representing the duration time that a subject of interest has been exposed to the risk of 
an event, it be the observed duration time that a subject of interest has been exposed to the risk of 
an event, and iu  be the duration time that a subject of interest has been exposed to the risk of an 
event at the sample selection time. To be eligible for a prospective study which intends to 
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observe the occurrence of the event, we require that subjects are at risk of exposure to the event 
at the time of selection and thus we have ii ut ≥  and 0>iu . For a subject which has been 
exposed to the risk and is currently eligible for the study, its duration time iT is left truncated at 
the sample selection time iu . Whereas the original hazard function is )|Pr( iiii tTtT >= where 
0>it , the hazard function for a left-truncated iT  is  
)|Pr(),|Pr( iiiiiiiiii tTtTuTtTtT >==≥>=  where ii ut ≥  (Lawless 2003: 67).  
With left-truncated data, if the start time of being at risk is unknown, we face the problem 
of a biased estimation of the hazard of failure because the full length of exposure to risk is 
unknown. However, if we know the actual start time of exposure to the risk of encountering an 
event, we can handle left truncation with the Conditional Likelihood Approach (Allison 2010; 
Guo 1993; Yang and Aldrich 2012).  In my sample, only 3% of employees hired by firms 
founded from 1994 to 1997 have an unidentifiable first year of employment.  
RESULTS 
              In this section, I first report the descriptive results for employees’ transitions into 
entrepreneurs and the characteristics of their employer organizations. I then test hypotheses using 
hazard models.  
Descriptive Results  
              The descriptive results in Table 1 show that the percentage of employees who transition 
into entrepreneurship is about 4%, similar with previous findings on entrepreneurial entry in 
other Nordic countries (Nanda and Sørensen 2010). The numbers are relatively smaller for 
employees who were newly hired in 1996 and 1997 than those in earlier years, partially because 
of the shorter observation periods. I also examined the rate of transition into entrepreneurship 
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given the year when an employee was newly hired at an establishment. Results in Figure 1 show 
that employees are less likely to become entrepreneurs as their job tenure increases at workplaces. 
              The bivariate relationships between the startup experiences of workplace peers and the 
individual rate of entry into entrepreneurship provide preliminary support for the effect of peer 
influence. As shown in Figure 2, compared to employees who do not have colleagues with prior 
startup experience, those who do are substantially more likely to become entrepreneurs. The 
relationship between entrepreneurial exposure and entry rates becomes weaker as workplace size 
increases. In small establishments, the presence of entrepreneurial peers increases a focal 
employees’ entry rate by more than one third, whereas the effect of entrepreneurial peers is fairly 
small in large establishments (more than 30 employees).  
              The smaller effect of entrepreneurial peers’ effect on employees’ transitions to 
entrepreneurship may be dependent on the size of entrepreneurial peers at establishments. Thus, I 
reported the number of employees who have prior startup experience given firm size. Taking 
1994 as an example (Figure 3), the number of entrepreneurial peers does not increase 
proportionally with the number of employees hired by an establishment. When an establishment 
only has 4 or less employees, on average about one of them has prior startup experience. When 
an establishment has more than 10 employees, the average number of employees who have prior 
startup experience is between 1.5 and 2. This may partially explain why peer influence on 
entrepreneurial entry is smaller in large firms: the influence of entrepreneurial peers is diluted as 
the number of employees increases at establishments.  
             Among establishments that do have some work peers having prior startup experience, 
most establishments (94%) have 1 employees having prior self-employed experience in the past 
five years. And then another 4 % have 2 former entrepreneurs. Less than 1% establishments have 
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more than 3 former entrepreneurs. Because there are so few former entrepreneurs in each firm, I 
will identify the 5-digit industry for each former entrepreneur, and see whether peer influence is 
dependent on the similarity of the former startup industry and a new entry’s industry. When there 
are multiple former entrepreneurs, some of them might have created startups in the same 
industries. In my sample (restricted sample given many criteria), because 99.75% firms have 
former entrepreneurs from less than 4 different industries, I focus on the three industries where 
most former entrepreneurs have created their businesses. For example, if the number of former 
entrepreneurs is 10, 8, 6, 5, 4, 3, 1 in industry A, B, C, D, E, F, I would only code industry A, B, 
C, because the industries where more former entrepreneurs located their startups supposedly 
have larger effects on current employees’ choices for their entrepreneurial activity.  
               As shown in the Figure 4, the similarity of former entrepreneur’s industry and current 
employer organization’s industry shows a bimodal distribution, so as the similarity of new 
startup’s industry and the current employer organization’s industry. Among former entrepreneurs 
who are currently employed in established organizations, 50% have started new businesses in 
industries that are completely different than their current employer organizations’ industry, 
where 30% have started new businesses in the exact same industry of their current employer 
organizations. Among employees who transitioned into entrepreneurship, 46% enter into a 
completely different industry, whereas 35% create spinouts, startups in the exact same industry.  
             To examine how former entrepreneurs’ specific-industry startup experience affects their 
work peers’ choices of industries for creating new businesses, I reported a cross-tab of the two 
similarity variables in figure 5: X variable is the similarity of new startup’s industry and the 
current employer organization’s industry, and Y variable is the similarity of former 
entrepreneur’s industry and current employer organization’s industry. The large values on the 
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dialog suggest that employees are more likely to create new businesses in their employer 
organizations’ industries when their work peers had startup experience in the same industry. 
Meanwhile, employees are more likely to create new businesses in different industries when their 
work peers had startup experience in different industries. This matrix supports the strong peer 
influence mechanism that an employee is more likely to start a new business in an industry 
where his/her coworker started a new business.   
            The two Indicators of a startup outcome for a former entrepreneur are Z score of 
entrepreneurial income in the same industry and county, and the ratio of a former entrepreneur’s 
current wage salary to his/her income from his/her new business in the year where he/she leaves 
the new business. Both of the two indicators affect former entrepreneurs’ perceptions of their 
previous startup experience and thus influence the way they shape work peers’ potential 
entrepreneurial activities. I show the distributions of the two indicators for similar-industry 
former entrepreneurs and different-industry former entrepreneurs in Table 2. With regard to the 
ratio of wage income to income from previous startups, about 50% of employees with prior 
startup experience make similar or less money from current wage jobs. About 10% of employees 
with prior startup experience in similar industry of their current workplaces make wage salaries 
at least 3 times as much as their previous entrepreneurial income, whereas 10% of employees 
with prior startup experience in different industries of their current workplaces make wage 
salaries at least 7 times as much as their previous entrepreneurial income. I suspect that 
entrepreneurs who make less income from their startups are more likely to switch to other 
industries when they look for wage jobs. Regarding Z score of entrepreneurial income in the 
same industry and county, the larger the Z value, the higher ranked a former entrepreneur’s 
income in the same county and industry. Whereas the median of the Z score for former 
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entrepreneurs who started new businesses similar with the establishment is 0.32, the median of 
the Z score is -0.29 for those who started new businesses in different industries. In addition to 
median, other percentiles are also much smaller for employees with prior startup experience in 
different industries than the ones with prior experience in same industries of the current 
workplaces. Consistent with the first indicator, the second indicator of former entrepreneurs’ 
performance outcomes suggests that entrepreneurs who make relatively less money from their 
startups compared to other entrepreneurs in the same region and industry are more likely to move 
to other industries for wage jobs.   
Model Results   
             Now I turn to multivariate regression models to further investigate the effect of peer 
influence on the transition to entrepreneurship, while controlling for important covariates of 
entrepreneurship. Because the descriptive results show a bimodal distribution of the similarity of 
the current establishment’s industry and the industry where an employee chooses to start his/her 
own business, I dichotomize the ordinal variable, 0 for entrepreneurial entry in a completely 
different industry, 1 for entrepreneurial entry in similar industry (a value of 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 of the 
ordinal variable). Correspondingly, I code the number of former entrepreneurs who started new 
businesses in similar industry with the current establishment, and the number of former 
entrepreneurs who started new businesses in a completely different industry than the current 
establishment. I use a competing risk model (Cox Regression for two competing events) to test 
how workplace peers’ industry-specific startup experiences affect prospective entrepreneurs’ 
choices for their startups.  
              I proposed two hypotheses that concern peer influence contingent on industry-specific 
knowledge that prior entrepreneurs may share with their workplace peers when they become 
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employees. According to the weak peer influence mechanism, a strong correlation does not 
necessarily exist between the full range of industries where coworkers have created startups and 
the industries where the focal employees create startups. Instead, employees’ likelihood of 
becoming entrepreneurs would only be significantly affected by the share of coworkers having 
prior startup experience in the same industries. An alternative mechanism, a strong peer-
influence mechanism posits that knowledge about industries constitutes major components that 
former entrepreneurs share with their work peers. In other words, peer influence shapes potential 
entrepreneurs’ preferences for industries where they create their new businesses. According to 
this argument, I would observe a strong correlation between the industries where coworkers have 
created startups and the industries where the focal employees create startups. The descriptive 
results seem have supported the strong peer influence mechanism.  
            Further analysis was conducted to test the strong and weak peer influence mechanisms 
using Cox Proportional models. All the models presented in Table 3 have included the full set of 
control variables at employee level and establishment level. To demonstrate the contingent effect 
of peer influence on specific industries, I first tested the number of coworkers who have prior 
entrepreneurial experience without differentiating whether they have started new businesses in 
the same industry of the establishment. Results in Model 1 show that the hazard for an employee 
to enter into entrepreneurship is 7% higher as the number of coworkers with prior entrepreneurial 
experience increases by one. Many control variables have significant effects on entrepreneurial 
entry. On average, years of education and age have positive effects on individuals’ transitions 
into entrepreneurship. Men’s hazard of becoming entrepreneurs is 67% higher than women, and 
prior startup experience makes one much more likely to start new business again. I also found 
that wage income has a substantial negative effect on an employee’s chance to become an 
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entrepreneur, consistent with the opportunity cost argument that employees having a better pay 
are less likely to forgo wage income loss to start their own business. Among firm-level control 
variables, whereas firm size discourages employees’ transitions to entrepreneurship, the 
percentage of female employees increases one’s chance to become an entrepreneur. It seems 
puzzling that working with more female employees would make one more entrepreneurial. 
Further analysis needs to be done to identify whether this effect is the same for male and female 
employees.     
             Model 2 and 3 present results from competing risk models that test the effect of work 
peers’ industry-specific prior startup experience on a focal employee’s chance to start a new 
business in a similar industry of the current employment (Model 2) and in a completely different 
industry (Model 3).  The number of entrepreneurial peers starting new businesses in the same 
industry of the establishment encourages employees to spinout but hinder employees’ 
entrepreneurial entry to other industries. In particular, associated with each additional work peer 
who has started new business in the similar industry, an employee’s rate of transition to 
entrepreneurship in a similar industry increases by 10% whereas his/her rate of transition to 
entrepreneurship in a different industry reduces by 11%. However, the number of entrepreneurial 
peers starting new businesses in industries different than the establishment does not affect 
employees’ likelihood to start new businesses in similar industries but significantly improves 
their likelihood to start new businesses in other industries.  
             To further demonstrate that the social influence of entrepreneurial peers is dependent on 
the industries where they started new businesses, I statistically tested the difference between the 
effects of same-industry and different-industry entrepreneurial peers. Results are presented in the 
last two columns of Table 3. Compared to employees who have no colleagues with prior startup 
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experience, employees who have one colleague with startup experience in the similar industry of 
the establishment are 23% more likely to become entrepreneurs in similar industries than in 
different industries. Meanwhile, an employee’s odds of starting a new business in different 
industries to similar industries increase by 21%, associated with each additional colleague with 
startup experience in industries that are different than the establishment. These arguments 
support the strong form peer influence mechanism that peer influence shapes potential 
entrepreneurs’ preferences for industries where they create their new businesses. A limitation of 
my current hypothesis testing of the strong/weak peer influence mechanisms is that I have not 
controlled for many other conditions that may affect employees’ preferences for industries where 
they create new businesses. More analysis needs to be done to identify the causal effects of peer 
influence on employees’ entries into different industries for entrepreneurship.  
             My second set of hypotheses posits that whereas individual rates of entrepreneurship will 
be higher when a greater share of coworkers in work environments has successful prior 
entrepreneurial experiences, individual rates of entrepreneurship has no relationship with 
unsuccessful prior entrepreneurial experiences by coworkers in work environment. I argued that 
work peers with successful startup experience contribute to prospective entrepreneurs’ over-
confidence biases by two mechanisms: First, individuals may overestimate their probability of 
success when they learn that their peers have successfully founded new businesses before. that 
when a greater share of coworkers has successful prior entrepreneurial experiences, individuals 
tend to believe that their decisions to become entrepreneurs are based on sound reasoning, in 
spite of their acknowledgement of others’ failed experience. By contrast, former entrepreneurs 
with negative previous startup experience are unlikely to affect their workplace peers’ 
entrepreneurial entries because they might be unwilling to share with others their unsuccessful 
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startups. Even if they gave work peers heads-ups about the precarious life chances of startups, 
people who are prone to launching startups might be unreceptive of such information. Based on 
the two continuous indicators of entrepreneurial outcomes – Z score of income from 
entrepreneurship and the ratio of wage income to income from previous startup, I code a former 
entrepreneur’s startup experience as positive when his/her income from entrepreneurship is 
above the average income of entrepreneurs in the same 5-digit industry and county, and when 
he/she is making more income from current wage job than a previous startup. I present models 
results for the two hypotheses in Table 4 (for the Z score measure) and Table 5 (for the measure 
of income ratio). Results shown in Table 4 and Table 5 are quite consistent, both showing that 
former entrepreneurs’ negative and positive startup experiences both increase their work peers’ 
entries into entrepreneurship. They provide mixed results for the hypotheses on previous 
entrepreneurial outcomes. Hypothesis 3 is supported that individual rates of entrepreneurship 
will be higher when a greater share of coworkers in work environments has successful prior 
entrepreneurial experiences. However, unlike what I proposed in Hypothesis 4 that unsuccessful 
prior entrepreneurial experiences by coworkers in work environment do not reduce individual 
rates of entrepreneurship, I found that negative prior startup experience of work peers also 
increases the focal employee’s transition to entrepreneurship. It suggests that individuals may 
boost their confidence in their own ability to successfully create new businesses if they perceive 
feedback from people who had failed startups useful for their own entrepreneurial activities.  
Conclusion    
              Analyzing a few key conditions of peer influence, my study provides a complex view of 
how entrepreneurs’ mobility from their startups to established organizations affect their work 
peers’ entry to entrepreneurship. Conventional wisdom suggests that an individual’s likelihood 
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of becoming an entrepreneur is positively associated with his peers’ similar previous experiences. 
Put it in other words, whether you would become an entrepreneur is dependent on what your 
peers have done in the past. Building on a few studies providing suggestive evidence that 
entrepreneurial colleagues inspire their work peers to start new businesses, I demonstrate that 
former entrepreneurs not only make their work peers to be more entrepreneurial but also affect 
their work peers’ choices of the industries for entrepreneurship. In addition to the industry-
specific feature of peer influence, I also proposed that former entrepreneurs’ performance 
outcomes serve as a condition that moderates their effects on coworkers’ entrepreneurial entry.  
My results show that whereas individual rates of entrepreneurship are higher when a greater 
share of coworkers in work environments has successful prior entrepreneurial experiences, and 
when a greater share of coworkers in work environments has unsuccessful prior entrepreneurial 
experiences. Even though former entrepreneurs’ negative and positive experiences provide 
different information on the market and what it looks like to be an entrepreneur, they both 
improve coworkers’ chances to start new businesses. It is possible that former entrepreneurs do 
not tell their work peers their previous failures or success. It is also possible that individuals are 
susceptible to overconfidence bias and tend to think that they have learned useful information 
from others’ failures. These results are robust because my models have included fixed effects for 
county and the year when an employee was hired by an establishment.  
            My research offers a few implications for our understanding of entrepreneurship. First, 
where previous research has investigated the structural features of workplaces such as size and 
age, my analyses demonstrate that the percentage of employees who have pervious startup 
experience also explains workplaces’ capability of spawning entrepreneurial activities. 
Established organizations are important source of entrepreneurship in capitalist societies, 
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partially because they make it possible for individuals to move between employment and 
entrepreneurship and they mix together individuals with various previous experiences. Second, 
given that established organizations serve as a setting for the occurrence of social contagion 
process of entrepreneurship among employees, organizational conditions that affect employee’s 
interaction and communication have crucial implication for the flow of information and ideas 
that might inspire entrepreneurial entry. Investigating such conditions requires rich information 
on the informal social groups within organizations and better data on the frequency of employees’ 
interaction. Third, my finding that former entrepreneurs’ previous failures do not discourage 
their work peers’ entrepreneurial activities reveals a possible mechanism that explains the high 
failure rate of entrepreneurship. It seems that individuals are not learning about the low life 
chances of startups from others’ previous failures and information about negative entrepreneurial 
experiences does not flow as much as positive ones. Future research may investigate whether 
feedback from others’ negative entrepreneurial experience can be more effective for learning 
about how to succeed in creating new businesses.      
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Table1. Percentage of Employees Transition to Entrepreneurship 
between 1990 and 2002 
First year employed in an establishment  Percent 
1990 4.38 
1991 4.36 
1992 4.70 
1993 5.13 
1994 4.87 
1995 3.54 
1996 2.33 
1997 0.51 
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Figure 4. Similarity of the Current Establishment’s Industry and a Former 
Entrepreneur’s Industry/a New Entrepreneur’s Industry 
Level of 
Industry 
Similarity 
Percent     Percent 
Level of 
Industry 
Similarity 
0 50% 
 
Former 
Ent 
New 
Ent 
 
  
46% 0 
1 9%  8% 1 
2 8%  7% 2 
3 3%  2% 3 
4 2%  2% 4 
5 30%  35% 5 
 
Figure 5 
Similarity of 
the Current 
Establishment’s 
Industry and a 
Former 
Entrepreneur’s 
Industry 
Similarity of the Current Establishment’s Industry and a New 
Entrepreneur’s Industry 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
0 62 35 36 37 25 37 
1 7 35 6 7 11 7 
2 4 3 32 5 9 8 
3 2 2 3 25 1 2 
4 1 2 2 1 34 2 
5 23 23 21 25 20 45 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Two Measures for Former Entrepreneurs' Startup Outcomes 
 
Ratio of Wage Income to 
Entrepreneurial Income 
Z score of entrepreneurial income in a 
county/industry 
 Similar 
Industry 
Different 
Industry 
Similar Industry Different Industry 
99% 70.09 160.96 3.63 3.13 
95% 6.17 18.05 2.17 1.73 
90% 2.90 7.48 1.70 1.19 
75% 1.46 2.61 1.02 0.36 
50% 1.09 1.27 0.32 -0.29 
25% 0.94 0.67 -0.34 -0.75 
10% 0.57 0.16 -0.87 -1.04 
5% 0.29 0.04 -1.08 -1.22 
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Table 3. Competing Risk Model Estimates of the Transition to Entrepreneurship 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 3 Compare Model 
2and 3  All Entries In Similar Industry In Diff Industry 
Variable Beta P Beta P Beta P Beta P 
# of Ent peers 0.075 <.0001 
      
 
(0.006) 
       
# of Ent peers in the similar 
ind    
0.088 <.0001 -0.117 <.0001 0.205 <.0001 
  
(0.007) 
 
(0.018) 
   
# of Ent peers in diff ind    
-0.002 0.899 0.238 <.0001 -0.241 <.0001 
  
(0.019) 
 
(0.010) 
   Age 0.212 <.0001 0.211 <.0001 0.209 <.0001 0.002 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
   Age squared -0.002 <.0001 -0.002 <.0001 -0.002 <.0001 0.000 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
   Years of Education 0.069 <.0001 0.074 <.0001 0.062 <.0001 0.013 
 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
   
Days of unemployment this 
Year 
0.001 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 0.002 <.0001 -0.001 <.0001 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
   Male 0.508 <.0001 0.567 <.0001 0.414 <.0001 0.153 <.0001 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.028) 
   Prior Startup Exp  0.496 <.0001 0.160 <.0001 0.884 <.0001 -0.723 <.0001 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.037) 
   Log income -0.181 <.0001 -0.115 <.0001 -0.248 <.0001 0.134 <.0001 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
   Log firm size -0.199 <.0001 -0.246 <.0001 -0.130 <.0001 -0.116 <.0001 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
   
Log mean income of 
employees 
0.067 <.0001 0.048 0.001 0.078 <.0001 -0.031 
 (0.011) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.016) 
   
Percentage of Female 
Employees 
0.282 <.0001 0.340 <.0001 0.193 <.0001 0.147 <.0005 
(0.024) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.039) 
   
Have at least one self-
employed  
-0.011 0.602 0.103 <.0001 0.038 0.3108 0.065 
 (0.021) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.038) 
   
Founding Year of an 
Establishment 
0.027 <.0001 0.046 <.0001 0.005 0.3284 0.041 <.0001 
(0.003) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
   Fix Effects of Counties 
        Fixed Effects of Year Recruitment 
      -2 LOG L 406434 240457 165078 
  AIC 406460 240485 165106 
  BIC 406564 240590 165206 
  OBS 2589580 2589580 2589580     
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Table 4. Competing Risk Model Estimates of the Transition to Entrepreneurship: Entry into Same or 
Different Industries 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Parameters 
Entry in Same Industry Entry in Diff Industry 
Beta P value HR Beta P  HR 
Z score of Entrepreneurial Income 
      Negative Exp in Similar Ind  0.513 <.0001 1.671 -0.053 0.282 0.948 
 
(0.038) 
  
(0.050) 
  Positive Exp in Similar Ind  0.398 <.0001 1.489 -0.163 <.0001 0.85 
 
(0.032) 
  
(0.041) 
  Negative Exp in Similar Ind  -0.012 0.800 0.988 0.577 <.0001 1.78 
 
(0.048) 
  
(0.042) 
  Positive Exp in Similar Ind  -0.045 0.245 0.956 0.543 <.0001 1.721 
Individual Level Control (0.039) 
  
(0.036) 
  Age 0.211 <.0001 1.235 0.210 <.0001 1.234 
 
(0.005) 
  
(0.006) 
  Age squared -0.002 <.0001 0.998 -0.002 <.0001 0.998 
 
(0.000) 
  
(0.000) 
  Years of Education 0.074 <.0001 1.077 0.060 <.0001 1.062 
 
(0.004) 
  
(0.005) 
  
Days of unemployment this Year 
0.001 <.0001 1.001 0.002 <.0001 1.002 
(0.000) 
  
(0.000) 
  Male 0.570 <.0001 1.769 0.421 <.0001 1.523 
 
(0.024) 
  
(0.028) 
  Have Prior Startup Exp  0.199 <.0001 1.220 0.977 <.0001 2.656 
 
(0.039) 
  
(0.036) 
  Log income -0.115 <.0001 0.892 -0.248 <.0001 0.780 
 
(0.010) 
  
(0.010) 
  Firm Level  Control 
      Log firm size -0.237 <.0001 0.789 -0.104 <.0001 0.901 
 
(0.007) 
  
(0.009) 
  
Log mean income of employees 
0.051 0.001 1.052 0.069 <.0001 1.071 
(0.015) 
  
(0.016) 
  
Percentage of Female Employees 
0.348 <.0001 1.416 0.179 <.0001 1.196 
(0.031) 
  
(0.039) 
  
Have at least one self-employed individual 
0.220 <.0001 1.246 -0.117 0.000 0.889 
(0.025) 
  
(0.032) 
  
Founding Year of an Establishment 
0.045 <.0001 1.046 0.003 0.512 1.003 
(0.004) 
  
(0.005) 
  Fix Effects of Counties 
      Fixed Effects of Year Recruitment 
      -2 LOG L 237902 
 
162652 
 AIC 237930 
 
162680 
 Obs 2589580   2589580   
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Table 5. Competing Risk Model Estimates of the Transition to Entrepreneurship: Prior Startup Outcomes 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Parameters 
Entry in Same Industry Entry in diff Industry 
Beta P  HR Beta P  HR 
Ratio of Wage to Entrepreneurial Income 
      Negative Exp in Similar Ind  0.435 <.0001 1.546 -0.160 0.0002 0.852 
 
(0.033) 
  
(0.043) 
  Positive Exp in Similar Ind  0.466 <.0001 1.594 -0.136 0.0014 0.873 
 
(0.033) 
  
(0.042) 
  Negative Exp in Similar Ind  -0.073 0.0539 0.929 0.442 <.0001 1.556 
 
(0.038) 
  
(0.035) 
  Positive Exp in Similar Ind  -0.001 0.9835 0.999 0.606 <.0001 1.833 
Individual Level Control (0.040) 
  
(0.037) 
  Age 0.211 <.0001 1.24 0.209 <.0001 1.233 
 
(0.005) 
  
(0.006) 
  Age squared -0.002 <.0001 1.00 -0.002 <.0001 0.998 
 
(0.000) 
  
(0.000) 
  Years of Education 0.074 <.0001 1.08 0.061 <.0001 1.063 
 
(0.004) 
  
(0.005) 
  
Days of unemployment this Year 
0.001 <.0001 1.00 0.002 <.0001 1.002 
(0.000) 
  
(0.000) 
  Male 0.571 <.0001 1.77 0.414 <.0001 1.513 
 
(0.024) 
  
(0.028) 
  Have Prior Startup Exp  0.182 <.0001 1.20 0.910 <.0001 2.484 
 
(0.039) 
  
(0.036) 
  Log income -0.115 <.0001 0.89 -0.249 <.0001 0.779 
 
(0.010) 
  
(0.010) 
  Firm Level  Control 
      Log firm size -0.238 <.0001 0.79 -0.120 <.0001 0.887 
 
(0.008) 
  
(0.009) 
  
Log mean income of employees 
0.048 0.001 1.05 0.072 <.0001 1.075 
(0.015) 
  
(0.016) 
  
Percentage of Female Employees 
0.344 <.0001 1.41 0.182 <.0001 1.200 
(0.031) 
  
(0.039) 
  
Have at least one self-employed individual 
0.149 <.0001 1.16 -0.037 0.2767 0.964 
(0.027) 
  
(0.034) 
  
Founding Year of an Establishment 
0.046 <.0001 1.05 0.003 0.5707 1.003 
(0.004) 
  
(0.005) 
  Fix Effects of Counties 
      Fixed Effects of Year Recruitment 
      -2 LOG L 240303.7 
  
165069.9 
  AIC 240331.7 
  
165097.9 
  Obs 2589580  2589580  
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CHAPTER TWO: WHEN DO MARRIED COUPLES BECOME CO-ENTREPRENEURS: 
THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY AND WORKPLACES 
            Post-industrial societies have experienced profound social changes in labor market and 
employment, leading to dramatic increases in dual-earner couples. In the United States, the 
percentage of dual earner couples among families with at least one labor force participant has 
increased to 67% in 2010, from 41% in 1980 (Benson 2010 ). The outnumbering of male earner 
families by dual-earner families is not limited to the United States but is a feature shared by 
every capitalist society. In France, 62.4% of couples in 2002 were double earners, according to 
the Labor Force Survey (LFS) (Lesnard 2008). In Nordic countries, men and women have nearly 
same labor participation rates in 2010, and a full- time dual-earner family model has become the 
predominant family model (Larsen and Møberg 2012). Recognizing the rises of dual-earner 
families in modern society, some sociologists have suggested that family households have 
become increasingly important in shaping gender inequality (Curtis 1986; Western et al. 2008).  
             Family households not only redistribute income but also affect men and women’s access 
to opportunities in the labor market. Studies have shown that wives and husbands’ socio-
economic attainments have become highly interdependent, manifest in their associated earnings 
(Cancian and Reed 1999; Fernandez et al. 2005; Schwartz 2010; Western et al. 2008), and job 
mobility (Benson 2010 ; Bielby and Bielby 1992; Geist and McManus 2012). Even though they 
are seemingly independent employees of the labor force, wives and husbands often make their 
joint decisions together and their joint decisions have found to be influential in increasing gender 
inequality in wage earnings (Sorenson and Dahl 2013). 
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            The existing literature has focused on understanding the conditions under which spousal 
couples jointly change their wage jobs and how their joint choices affect husbands and wives’ 
wage salaries (Bielby and Bielby 1992; Geist and McManus 2012; McKinnish 2008). The 
intense focus on wage jobs is natural: most people are employees of established organizations for 
the bulk of their careers, and most spousal couples earn income from their wage jobs. Yet, 
employment in an established firm is far from the only career choice (Sørensen and Sharkey 
2014), and economic production is far from being entirely separated from family production in 
modern society (Winch 1970).  
            Every year, millions of individuals embark on new venture creation and the numbers are 
still increasing. Empirical evidence has shown that one fifth of American women have had 
experience with creating new businesses by their mid-thirties (Ferber and Waldfogel 1998), and 
40% of American men had such experience by their mid-fifties (Arum and Mueller 2004). In 
post-industrial societies where the service sector has replaced the manufacturing sector in taking 
the precedence in the economy (Kalleberg 2011), it is expected that more individuals will enter 
into entrepreneurship because creating new businesses requires less financial resources than 
before. Because service industries are less male-predominated than manufacturing, scholars have 
also anticipated a larger percentage of younger women entering into small enterprises than older 
cohorts. Among the numerous people starting their own businesses, about 80% of them involve 
family members and at least 35% of them have spouses as co-owner founders (Aldrich and Cliff 
2003; Ruef et al. 2003; Sharifian et al. 2012). Taking together, numerous spousal couples face 
the problem of choosing between wage jobs and starting their own new businesses, and their 
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decisions may have profound influences for their careers, as well as their overall family well-
being.  
             This paper investigates the question of under what conditions spousal couples depart 
from their wage jobs to become co-entrepreneurs. Whereas some spousal couples jointly create 
new business together, others may decide to have one person becoming an entrepreneur while 
the other person remaining employed in an established organization. Two theoretical models, one 
economic, the other sociological, have provided different explanations of the heterogeneity of 
spousal couples’ joint entrepreneurial statues. The neoclassical economic model conceptualizes 
entrepreneurship as a process of discovering and pursuing startup opportunities. It posits that 
individuals acquire knowledge know-how to discover startup opportunities, and they are more 
likely to exploit opportunities if they can mobilize resources needed for achieving success 
(Agarwal et al. 2004; Franco and Filson 2006; Hellmann 2007; Shane 2003). In the process of 
discovering and pursuing startup opportunities, individuals are likely to recruit others when they 
receive informational or material support from potential team members. An implicit assumption 
of the neoclassical economic model is that discoveries and pursuit of startup opportunities are 
gender-neutral, i.e. universalistic with regard to gender. Accordingly, a spousal couple is likely 
to get involved in creating new businesses together if at least one of them has discovered a 
startup opportunity and the other person is capable of providing resource. It means that a spousal 
couple’s chances of becoming co-entrepreneurs are independent of whether it is the wife or the 
husband who discovers an opportunity or/and initiates entrepreneurial activities.  
However, the sociological literature suggests that the process of spousal couples’ 
transitions to co-entrepreneurship may be gender asymmetric. The first potential gender 
asymmetry may stem from the gender-biased perceptions of entrepreneurial opportunities 
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discovered by men and women. Status expectation theory posits that social beliefs about gender 
imply hegemonic assumptions, leading individuals to discriminate (often unconsciously and 
automatically) against women by discounting their competencies at highly valued skills (Berger 
et al. 1980; Ridgeway et al. 1994). Abundant empirical evidence shows that new venture creation 
has historically been seen as an arena for businessmen, and the purported characteristics of 
successful entrepreneurs, such as “agentic,” “pragmatic,” and “risk-taking,” are stereotypically 
masculine characteristics (Calas et al. 2009). When gender acts as a salient status characteristic, 
cultural beliefs about gender prescribe higher expectations for men’s competence (Foschi 2000). 
Accordingly, a startup opportunity discovered by a man may be perceived as more promising, 
and thus worth his own effort and his wife’s time and resource. Such a gender-biased perception 
of men’s better capability of identifying startup opportunities makes them more accountable as 
the person initiating entrepreneurial activities and more likely to convince their spouses to join as 
co-founders.  
The second possible gender asymmetry in the process of co-entrepreneurship may be 
from family-embedded gender roles, male breadwinner and female homemaker roles (Brines 
1994; Gorman 1999). Men and women’s self-fulfillment of their gender roles affect their 
propensities to exit their wage jobs to join their spouses in founding new businesses. Research 
has shown that women’s own wages are less predictive of their exits from the labor force than 
their husbands’ (Shafer 2011), in spite of women’s increased labor participation rates since the 
1960s. Similar gender patterns -- women compromise their own careers for families or husbands’ 
entrepreneurial ventures -- have also been found in studies of self-employment (Budig 2006a; 
Jurik 1998). The implication of these findings for spousal couples’ co-entrepreneurship is that 
even when startup opportunities discovered by men and women are equally valuable, women 
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would be less likely to recruit their husbands as co-founders than men to recruit their wives 
because normative expectations presume the priority of men’s career choice and women’s 
support for their husbands’ careers. It suggests that men may be less likely to act as co-founders 
if they themselves were not persons discovering a startup opportunity.  
Distinguishing between the two competing theoretical accounts is crucial for achieving a 
better understanding of spousal couples’ joint choices in the setting of entrepreneurship, which 
has been less explored than other socioeconomic attainments in the labor market. However, it has 
been difficult to conduct causal analysis of spousal couples’ joint involvement in 
entrepreneurship rigorously. First, it has been difficult to demonstrate the causal effect of spousal 
relationships on their co-entrepreneurship. It requires one to sort out the contingent effects of 
workplaces and family households in a two-stage process: Once men or women identified startup 
opportunities at their wage jobs, how do gendered roles embedded in spousal relationships affect 
their spouses’ likelihood to join as co-founders? Previous research has suggested that working on 
wage jobs in established organizations allows prospective entrepreneurs to discover opportunities 
and assemble resources. In addition, the opportunity cost of launching a startup is dependent on a 
promising entrepreneur’s current wage salary (Amit et al. 1995). Thus, a prediction of spousal 
couples’ co-entrepreneurship requires information on the potential opportunities wives and 
husbands face in their workplaces. In addition, family conditions, including the relative wage 
income of husband and wife, and the number of children, affect the salience and relevance of 
gendered roles, and accordingly the magnitude of gender asymmetry in decision-making. 
However, previous designs have rarely collected information on both. Whereas data sets on 
households, including Panel Study of Income Dynamics, have little information on individuals’ 
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workplaces, research designs for businesses, such as Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics, 
have focused on new businesses but fail to provide rich information on family households.  
               Second, it has been difficult to observe a full set of spousal couples’ entrepreneurship 
status even though they all contribute to the heterogeneity: neither of a spousal couple became an 
entrepreneur, one of them, wife or husband, and both of them. Most previous designs have 
included entrepreneurial founders and thus left out the group of people who did not become 
entrepreneurs. Without an observation of a complete set of outcomes regarding entrepreneurial 
entry, it would be difficult to identify the mechanisms of sorting spousal couples into different 
entrepreneurial status, in order to explain why some couples become entrepreneurs together 
whereas others only have one person involved.      
             I address these limitations by using data from Sweden to investigate wives and husbands’ 
transitions into entrepreneurship, taking into account their separate employment in the labor 
market and their joint household conditions. Sweden has been an exemplary corporatist society 
that has a long tradition of adopting public policies to rectify gender-stereotyped social roles for 
men and women (Furåker 2005). Studying a country that has always been expected to have less 
gender inequality than other capitalist societies allows me to demonstrate the resilient cultural 
beliefs about gender and their effects on perpetuating gender inequality. To develop a theoretical 
model, I first identify the “lead entrepreneur” and the “follower” in a spousal couple by 
estimating each person’s propensity to entrepreneurial entry based on organizational conditions. 
These conditions include networks of work peers and the bureaucratic characteristics of 
employer organizations. I then theorize family household conditions – spousal couples’ 
comparative wage advantage and gender expectations associated with children – that affect 
spousal couples’ joint involvement in entrepreneurship. The data I use for my analysis combine a 
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matched employee-employer data set of working adults in the Swedish labor markets between 
1994 and 2002 and a matched husbands-wives data set. While the matched employee-employer 
data allow me to track employees as examine their workplace conditions, the matched husbands-
wives data provide rich information on family households that may contribute to spousal couples’ 
transitions into entrepreneurship.  
             My results suggest that women’s chances to become entrepreneurs are constrained by 
their limited access to entrepreneurial peers at workplaces. Meanwhile, the differential effects of 
work peers on men and women’s exposures to information on and skills for creating startups are 
substantially moderated by family conditions. Three family conditions are particularly important: 
men’s dominance in spousal relationships, the relative comparative advantage of spousal couples’ 
earnings, and the presence of children in the households. My results show that family-embedded 
gender logic interacts with gender difference in social dynamics at workplaces in shaping gender 
inequality in entrepreneurship.    
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF CO-ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
             The process that leads to spousal couples’ associated involvement in entrepreneurship 
may consist of two steps: first, an individual’s exposure to work peers having previous startup 
experience increases his/her propensity to start new businesses; second, similar knowledge 
spillover happens between spousal couples in their households, and wives and husbands decide if 
they want to create a new business together. To develop a theoretical framework explaining 
spousal couples’ co-entrepreneurship, I first examine each person’s potential to become an 
entrepreneur -- to discover and pursue startup opportunities -- in the context of his/her workplace. 
I estimate the propensity of entering to entrepreneurship for each member of the spousal couple 
unit, wife and husband, based on characteristics of workplaces that have found to be predictive 
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of an employee’s entrepreneurial entry. I then propose testable specifications regarding spousal 
relationships that affect wives and husbands’ joint involvement in creating new businesses.  
Identifying the “Lead Entrepreneur” and the “Follower” 
            The literature on employee entrepreneurship has noted the importance of peer influence 
in shaping employees’ entry to entrepreneurship, and they have found that a variety of workplace 
attributes, including size and age, affect employees’ propensities to become entrepreneurs by 
structuring employees’ exposure to work peers who had startup experience (Elfenbein et al. 2010; 
Gompers et al. 2005; Kacperczyk 2012b; Lazear 2005). Theories have argued that the magnitude 
of social influence regarding a behavior is affected by the relative number of actors who have 
such experience in established organizations (Blau 1977: Chapter Two; Blau et al. 1982; Kanter 
1977; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987). In addition, employees’ perceived appropriateness of 
switching from employment in establishments to starting new firms is dependent on whether 
their peers have engaged in such activities (Galaskiewicz 1985; Ibarra and Andrews 1993; 
Lawrence 2006; Sorensen 2002). Under the condition when new businesses’ life chances are 
uncertain, individuals are likely to imitate socially proximate actors to infer the degree to which 
launching startups is appropriate (Rogers 1995; Stuart and Sorenson 2005). Previous research 
has demonstrated that individual rates of entrepreneurship are higher in work environments 
where a greater share of coworkers has prior entrepreneurial experiences. 
             An important implication of a peer-influence effect on entrepreneurial entry is that 
women may be less likely to become entrepreneurs than men because of their less exposure to 
entrepreneurial peers. In Sørensen (2007)’s analysis of employees in Denmark, male employees’ 
odds of transitioning into entrepreneurship are twice as much as the odds for female employees. 
A relatively smaller but still substantial gender gap of 84% is found in Kacperczyk (2012a)’s 
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research on mutual funds in the U.S. Many other studies have also found significant gender 
differences in entrepreneurial entry (Bates 1995; Dobrev and Barnett 2005; Kacperczyk 2012b). 
Because these studies have controlled for a large number of influential factors at establishments’ 
level, the remained gender gaps in entrepreneurship entry between men and women are more 
likely to be from individual differences in exposure to peer influence and/or the magnitude of 
peer influences on them.  
             My prediction of individual employees’ transitions to entrepreneurship takes into 
account sex segregation in interactional networks, and differential allocation of network rewards 
for men and women (Friedkin and Cook 1990; Marsden and Friedkin 1993). Peer influence 
theory has suggested that individuals have preference for network homophily, i.e., interaction 
with others in the same sex group (Brass 1984; Fernandez and Sosa 2005; Ibarra 1992; 
McPherson et al. 2001). Because entrepreneurship has historically been male-predominated, 
established organizations often have more male employees with previous startup experience than 
female employees with similar experience (Calas et al. 2009). Under the condition that there are 
more male employees having startup experience than female employees, gender homogeneity in 
social networks limits women employees’ exposure to entrepreneurial peers. Given the 
availability of network ties with work peers, men may receive greater instrumental returns from 
their exposure to male co-workers. Previous research has suggested that whereas women are 
more likely to develop friendship with and seek for emotional help from women, both of the two 
sexes rely on social ties with men for instrumental resources (Ibarra and Andrews 1993). 
Because transmission of information and knowledge regarding startups often happens at informal 
social events or occasions, people in the same sex group have more opportunities to share 
information with each other. Based on above reasoning, women would be less likely than men to 
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make startup discoveries and thus are less likely to become entrepreneurs.   
Gender Roles and Spousal Couples’ Co-entrepreneurship 
            Women may be less likely to become entrepreneurs given the constraints they face at 
workplaces, but their chances may increase if they are exposed to entrepreneurial husbands at 
home. It means that whereas women are constrained by their opportunities at workplaces to 
become the lead entrepreneurs, they are likely to transition to entrepreneurship as followers of 
their husbands. Previous research has provided some empirical support that knowledge spillover 
that happens among coworkers might also occur between husbands and wives, because couples 
share a large amount of time in households (Bruce 1999). For example, by analyzing data from 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Parker (2008) found that the unconditional probability of 
being a business owner in the sample is 13.3% for men and 6.8% for women. However, “men 
whose wife is certain of being a business owner have a 17 percentage point higher probability of 
being a business owner than if they were married to a woman who was certain not to be a 
business owner. The corresponding figure for women is 19 percentage points.” Thus, in addition 
to workplaces, family households also shape the probability that an individual transitions to 
entrepreneurship.  
            Research on labor economics views knowledge spillover within spousal couples as a 
process in which both male and female spouses receive positive knowledge transfers from the 
other. Extending their explanations of entrepreneurial entry into the domain of family, 
researchers adopting an economic model argued that information and knowledge about business 
ownership and business conditions can be shared easily and efficiently between spouses (Bruce 
1999; Parker 2008). Thus an individual’s entry to entrepreneurship is not just an independent 
occupation choice, instead, it is a transition associated with the entrepreneurial entry of his/her 
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spouse. While economic theories have incorporated spousal couples’ interdependence in their 
explanations of co- entrepreneurship, they did not further specify the conditions that may affect 
husbands or wives’ dominance in their mutual influence. As a consequence, empirical studies 
adopting an economic model either only investigated the effect of a husband’s self-employment 
experience on his wife’s (Bruce 1999), or examined wife and husband’s mutual influence 
without comparing their effects (Parker 2008).  
            However, the sociological literature on spousal relationships has suggested the dominant 
influence of husbands in spousal couples. Scholars of gender have argued that the male-
breadwinner cultural norm has proven resilient in the past four decades, and continues to shape 
the expectations that men should be the primary earners (Cha and Thébaud 2009; Gorman 1999; 
Thébaud 2010). The cultural norm of male breadwinners in families prescribes the dominance of 
husbands in spousal couples’ mutual influence and the priorities given to husbands’ attainment in 
the labor market. Research has consistently found that husbands’ employment affects wives’ 
socioeconomic attainment, including their earnings, exit from labor force, and job mobility. 
However, wives’ do not affect their husbands’ (Shauman and Noonan 2007). Furthermore, even 
though women’s employment has increased dramatically (Cotter et al. 2004), women are less 
likely to relocate for better jobs so as not to influence their husbands’ jobs. More often than not 
women were the “tied movers” or “tied stayers” in job mobility or family immigration (Benson 
2010 ; Bielby and Bielby 1992).  
            Analyzing a representative sample of entrepreneurial teams, Yang and Aldrich (2014) 
found that gender asymmetry exists in spousal teams that husbands’ employment and wages are 
more predictive of wives’ status in the new businesses. These studies suggest that in the 
transitioning process from employment to entrepreneurship, husbands are more likely to be the 
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entrepreneurs initiating decisions regarding startups whereas wives are more likely to be the tied 
“movers” joining their husbands to be supportive of family businesses. In contrast with husbands 
who are likely to be the lead entrepreneurs in spousal teams, wives who have made startup 
discoveries on their wage jobs may face normative barriers in recruiting their husbands. 
            Therefore, I argue that knowledge spillover about startups between husbands and wives is 
more likely to be driven by a male- dominant logic rather than a gender-neutral logic. Therefore, 
I expect that: 
Hypothesis 1: Whereas husbands’ higher propensities to entrepreneurship lead to spousal 
couples co-entrepreneurship, wives’ higher propensities to entrepreneurship do not necessarily 
increase spousal couples’ chances to start new businesses jointly. 
The Effects of Fatherhood and Motherhood 
              Previous research has extensively examined the effects of children on men and women’s 
socio-economic attainment. Although the sizes of the effects vary across contexts, motherhood 
generally has negative effects on women’s earnings (Budig and England 2001; Budig and 
Hodges 2010; Correll et al. 2007; Townsend 2002), whereas fatherhood often leads to a “daddy 
bonus” for men in wage jobs (Glauber 2008; Hodges and Budig 2010; Killewald 2013). To 
explain motherhood penalties and fatherhood wage premiums, researchers have proposed 
demand-side and supply-side theories (Budig and England 2001; Correll et al. 2007; Killewald 
2013).  
            The demand-side theory posits that social beliefs about motherhood and fatherhood imply 
hegemonic assumptions, leading individuals to discriminate (often unconsciously and 
automatically) against mothers by discounting their competencies at highly valued skills (Berger 
et al. 1980; Ridgeway et al. 1994). For example, drawing on status characteristic theory, Correll 
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et al. (2007) argued that motherhood is a devalued status in workplace settings, and thus 
associated with lower expectations for mothers’ performance. Because good performances are 
inconsistent with expectations for a devalued status of motherhood, mothers’ performances 
would be judged with stricter standards even when they perform well at work. Their 
experimental studies proved that women were penalized for their motherhood characteristics and 
perceived less competent than women who do not have kids. By contrast, fatherhood is a valued 
status in workplace settings and it is often associated with higher expectations for performance 
and commitment at work than “manhood” (Coltrane 2000; Correll et al. 2007).  
           Whereas the demand-side theory emphasizes the audiences’ biased evaluations of mothers 
and fathers, the supply-side theory highlights individuals’ self-fulfillment of gendered 
expectations for their responsibilities at home and work. Because normative expectations 
regarding motherhood presume women’s support for family and responsibility for childcare, 
women’s productivity at work and the extent to which women devote themselves to their jobs 
depend on household conditions regarding children (Budig 2006b; Jurik 1998). Budig and 
England (2001) examined up to five mechanisms that lead to motherhood penalty and they have 
found that women lose at least some employment time for child-rearing, and the loss of on-the-
job training interrupts women’s cultivation of firm-specific skills. Their results also showed that 
even when mothers do not leave their employment for childcare, they are still underperformed at 
work because they have to store energy for anticipated work at home (Becker 1991). Hochschild 
(1989) has made a similar argument that the extra burden of the second shift makes women less 
engaged at their wage jobs. By contrast, research on fatherhood wage premium has shown that 
fatherhood increases men’s feelings for taking responsibilities and motivates men to change their 
behaviors, such as work longer hours, for better labor-market productivity and income (Glauber 
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2008; Hodges and Budig 2010; Killewald 2013; Sheldon and Burke 2000). 
            The supply-side and demand-side theories both suggest that motherhood and fatherhood 
shape the audiences’ expectations for men and women, and individuals’ self-fulfillment of 
responsibilities for work and family. Following previous research, I argue that in the field of 
entrepreneurship, fatherhood is associated with men’s more ambitions for earning household 
income and expectations that men become more responsible for their behaviors in the labor 
market. As a consequence, men with more children are under stronger pressure to pursue startup 
opportunities to fulfill breadwinner roles, while everything else, including wage salaries, remains 
equal. Because motherhood shapes expectations for women’s heavy responsibility for childcare 
and more flexible work schedules, women may be more likely to become co-founders for the 
sick of family and their husbands’ careers. According to my argument, the male advantage in 
recruiting wives as cofounders is even bigger among spousal couples having more children. Thus, 
my hypothesis 2 is: 
Hypothesis 2: The positive effect of husbands’ propensities to entrepreneurship on spousal 
couples’ likelihood to be co-entrepreneurship is larger when the salient gender roles associated 
with fatherhood and motherhood are relevant.  
Gender Deviance and Spousal Couples’ Comparative Advantage  
             A third specification of dual-earner couples’ transitions into entrepreneurship concerns 
spousal couples’ comparative wage advantage. Scholars of gender inequality have argued that 
the gender roles embedded in spousal relationships have been institutionalized as “breadwinners” 
and “homemakers,” with these terms indicating men’s primary responsibility for earning (most) 
household income and women’s economic (at least partial) dependency on their husbands 
(Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Greenstein 2000; Schneider 2012). Empirical studies have 
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demonstrated that men often demonstrate their fitness for the role of breadwinner by earning 
more income than their wives. In normal situations, spousal couples’ relative wage earnings are 
consistent with their support and dependent relations (Ridgeway 2011: Chapter 5). However, in 
situations where wives turned out to be the primary earner, couples face the problem of holding 
themselves accountable to normative expectations. Research on the division of labor at home 
suggested that when married couples fail to conform to the “male breadwinner” expectation, they 
attempt to engage in gender-typical activities inside the family household so as to neutralize the 
gender deviance created by the disparity in their achievements (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; 
Greenstein 2000; Schneider 2012).  
            Based on the gender deviance neutralization argument, I predict that in the setting of new 
businesses where tasks are male-stereotyped, deviant couples in which husbands earn less in the 
labor market than their wives will avoid working together in creating new ventures so as not to 
not further threaten their masculinity and femininity (Schneider 2012: 1033). Because 
stereotypical startups are highly profitable, creating new businesses may be seen as a way that 
allows husbands to correct for their gender deviance in earnings. Thus husbands will take the 
opportunity to demonstrate that they can earn more household income, and their wives would 
respect for husbands’ independent involvement in new businesses. Thus I propose that in dual-
earner married couples, gender deviance in socioeconomic attainment in the labor market would 
deter husbands and wives’ joint involvement in new businesses.  
H3. Deviant couples are less likely than normal couples to simultaneously become entrepreneurs.  
Variance of Gender Egalitarianism among Spousal Couples 
             The lower likelihood of deviant couples’ joint involvement in new businesses that is 
proposed in hypothesis 3 might be a result of higher levels of gender egalitarian attitudes shared 
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by “deviant” couples. Because family businesses were more present in traditional society than in 
modern capitalist society, couples whose relationships are less influenced by gender logic would 
reject the traditional notion of husbands and wives working on new businesses together. This 
argument suggests that compared to normal couples that are more receptive of family members 
collectively engaging in activities creating businesses, gender-deviant husbands and wives would 
find creating family businesses less appealing or less suitable. Accordingly, the extent to which 
individuals’ acceptance of traditional gender roles in family businesses, rather than gender-
deviance mechanism I proposed in hypothesis 3, would be the main driver of deviant couples’ 
lower likelihood of creating family businesses. This arguments poses threats to the validity of the 
causal argument I made above that gender deviant couples intentionally avoid working together 
so as not to further threaten their masculinity and femininity.  
              To demonstrate the causal effect of gender deviance on deterring spousal couples’ joint 
involvement in entrepreneurship, I test if the effect of gender deviance is dependent on the type 
of a new business. When new businesses are high-tech companies or in knowledge-intensive 
industries, they are the settings infused with less gendered meanings compared to mom-and-pop 
shops in traditional industries. These businesses may be seen as more appropriate by deviant 
couples so I would not observe the lower likelihood of deviant couples’ joint involvement than 
normal couples. So my last hypothesis is:  
H4. Deviant couples are less likely than normal couples to simultaneously become entrepreneurs 
only if the couples are starting new businesses in traditional industries.  
GENDER INEQUALITY IN SWEDEN 
              The national context for my study is Sweden. Sweden has been an exemplary corporatist 
society that has a long tradition of adopting public policies to rectify gender-stereotyped social 
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roles for men and women (Furåker 2005). Since the 1970s, extensive family-friendly policies 
were adopted in Sweden to free women’s time from childcare, including extended parental 
leaves and government subsidies to families and day care centers (Moen 1989). However, 
empirical evidence suggests that whereas there have been rapid increases in women’s 
employment in the labor market and dual-earner household families in Sweden, substantial 
gender gaps exist in earnings.  
              The Swedish gender system in the past three decades has a dual feature of resilient 
cultural support for reducing gender equality and deregulation of employment relations that freed 
power to employers but increased gender inequality.  
Institutional Support for Gender Egalitarianism  
            Sweden has been an exemplary corporatist society, in which the socio-democratic welfare 
state and liberal-egalitarian values have made great strides toward achieving greater gender 
equality (Goldthorpe 1984). Abundant empirical evidence suggests that among industrialized 
nations, the level of egalitarianism in gender attitudes is the greatest in Scandinavia, particularly 
in Sweden (Baxter and Kane 1995). Whereas movements toward greater gender inequality have 
been stalled in most industrialized societies, egalitarian values supporting a balance between men 
and women’s employment and family responsibilities remained their salience in Sweden (Scott 
1982). A report to the United Nation about Swedish women’s status explicitly stated: “the aim of 
a long-term ‘programme for women’ must be that every individual, irrespective of sex, shall 
have the same practical opportunities, not only for education and employment, but also in 
principle the same responsibility for his or her own maintenance as well as shared responsibility 
for the upbringing of children and the upkeep of the home… the government is well aware that 
this view appears revolutionary and unrealistic in the eyes of the representatives of many other 
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countries. A growing opinion in Sweden has, however, rallied to its support.” (Dahlström 1971). 
In addition to their significance in public domains, egalitarian values are also manifest in private 
domains in Sweden, especially in family households.  Empirical studies have found that there 
have been relatively balanced task relations between husbands and wives in Sweden as compared 
to other industrialized countries. For example, Swedish women are less economically dependent 
on their husbands, and Swedish men do more housework than their counterparts in other 
countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia, and Norway (Baxter and Kane 1995).   
             In addition to cultural norms supporting gender equity, Sweden has a long tradition of 
adopting public policies to rectify gender-stereotyped social roles in employment and family 
responsibility (Furåker 2005). One of the main thrusts of legislative reform in the 1970s was to 
eliminate or refine the principle that the man is the only or primary breadwinner in the family 
(Moen 1989: 26). Individual income taxation for everyone was introduced in 1971, which has led 
to a rapid increase in the extent to which women obtained gainful employment (Wistrand 1981). 
Comprehensive family-friendly policies were adopted to free women’s time from childcare, 
including extended parental leaves and government subsidies to families and day care centers 
(Moen 1989). Underlying these inclusive public policies are the concerted efforts made by 
government and union to improve work conditions for women and working mothers (Scott 1982; 
Wistrand 1981). 
Deregulation of the Labor Market 
              Some sociologists have depicted the significant shifts toward deregulation and 
reorganization of employment relations in the United States since the 1970s (Kalleberg 2011; 
Kalleberg 2009; Osterman 1999). Similar transformations have also occurred in Sweden (Fulcher 
1987; Hedström 1986; Kemeny 1992; Rydgren 2005). From the 1950s to the early 1980s, wage 
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salaries in Sweden were determined to a large extent through centralized collective bargaining at 
the national level. Solidaristic wage policies were implemented to reduce income disparities for 
equal jobs across employer organizations and industries. These policies, in combination with the 
broad coverage of unions and the highly centralized confederation of employers in Sweden, 
effectively suppressed overall earning inequalities in the Swedish labor market (Hibbs 1991; 
Rosenfeld and Kalleberg 1990). However, they also resulted in a few unexpected consequences, 
such as unnatural constraints on firms’ competition and productivities.  Since the early 1980s, 
market forces became predominant in regulating employment relations. A number of new 
legislative reforms were adopted to increase firms’ autonomy in determining wages (Fulcher 
1987). Unlike the declining union strength in the United States since the1980s, trade unions 
maintained their broad coverage in Sweden and continued to be influential in negotiating wages 
with employers. However, unions’ attitudes toward solidaristic employment systems became 
mixed since the late 1970s, and more policies were called for to unleash freedom to individual 
organizations or local governments. Since then, the national confederation of employers adopted 
less-interventionist practices to improve firms’ bargaining power in determining wages. Some 
empirical studies have shown that as more freedom and latitude were given to local agreements, 
inter-organizational variation in earnings between equal jobs has increased remarkably in 
Sweden (Blau and Kahn 1996; Elliott and Bender 1997; Hibbs 1991).  
             Even though cultural support for greater gender equity in Sweden has been robust, 
substantial gender inequality exists in Sweden. In their cross-national studies, Mandel and his 
associates have reported that Swedish women, especially mothers of preschool children have 
relatively high labor participation rates compared to other countries. In particular, the percentage 
of women employed in the public sector in Sweden is 42%, more than twice the percentage of 
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women employed in this sector in any of the other 6 industrialized countries studied (Gornick 
and Jacobs 1998). However, women’s wages are only 70% of their male coworkers’.    
METHOD 
Data 
             The data I use for my analyses are taken from a database called Longitudinal Integration 
Database for Health Insurance and Labor Market Studies (LISA). LISA database presently holds 
annual registers since 1990 and includes all individuals 16 years of age and older that were 
registered in Sweden as of December 31 for each year. Thus, the data comprise working married 
adults residing legally in Sweden from 1989 who were aged between 18 and 65. These 
individuals are also tracked forward in time until 2002. These restrictions mean that some of 
those in the labor force in years before 1989 are not in the sample. The database integrates 
existing data from the labor market, educational and social sectors and is updated each year with 
a new annual register. The individual is the primary object in LISA, but connections to family 
(including parents, spouses, and siblings), companies and places of employment are also 
available. The connections to spouses, including married spouse, registered partner, and 
unregistered partner, allow me to identify spousal pairs.  
Sample 
             From the database of LISA, I constructed a sample for my analyses according to five 
criteria.  
              First: because I’m interested in the effects of workplaces and family on spousal couples’ 
involvements in entrepreneurship, my analyses concern two durations: the duration of an 
individual’s employment in an organization, and the duration of an individual’s marriage. The 
events that I expect to observe are wives’ transitions into entrepreneurship and husbands’ 
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transitions into entrepreneurship. Within the observation period of 1989 to 2002, both individuals’ 
employment status and marital status may change. Because I want to track individuals back five 
years prior to the current year, I define the time of being at risk for a married working adult to 
become an entrepreneur is the first time he/she is employed by a new workplace between 1994 
and 2002. 4 Because I choose 1994 as the earliest possible initial year of being at risk for 
occurrence of entrepreneurship, the data are left-truncated when they include individuals for 
whom the observation period starts after the first year of employment in a firm. These 
individuals are employees hired by firms founded in 1989 or before (presumably these firms 
were founded in 1989 to before). Some researchers have taken a more conservative approach to 
handle left-truncation by only including individuals who started their jobs in the first year of 
their observation period. Because knowing the initial time of being at risk of entering into 
entrepreneurship allows me to control for left-truncation, I choose a more inclusive sample by 
including employees whose first year of employment is from 1990 onwards. It is possible that 
wives and husbands became employed in the labor market at different time points. Because I 
want to follow individuals for at least 5 years, the time of being at risk for individuals and 
couples needs to be no later than 1997. Regarding the censoring time for couples when neither of 
husbands and wives became entrepreneurs, there are potentially three censoring time: (1) the last 
year of the observation period, the year of 2002; (2) the year when their marriage ends. It means 
that a couple will be no longer in my analysis from the year when their marriage ends; (3) the 
year since then both husbands and wives are no longer employed in the labor market. Whichever 
of the three came latest is the censoring time for spousal couples in which neither husbands nor 
wives became entrepreneurs.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Because one of my key variables is the number of co-workers who had startup experience in the 
past five years, I need to be able to trace them back 5 years from the current year. 
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             Second, because I’m interested in spousal couples’ mutual influence given their 
employment, I excluded spousal couples in which either of husbands and wives were never 
employed from 1994 to 2002. It means that if either of husbands or wives were never employed 
from 1994 or 2002, both husbands and wives were completely excluded from the sample. 
Therefore, the sample does not include couples that were never dual-earner couples in the period 
of 1994 to 2002 (only 1% of spousal couples in the data are excluded by this criterion). Third, to 
obtain a complete employment history of an individual in his/her employer organization prior to 
transitioning into entrepreneurship, I excluded individuals who were hired by their employer 
organizations in 1989 or before 1989. Because these individuals’ initial time of at risk for 
entrepreneurial entry is unknown, they cause left-truncation problem that can’t be fixed in 
transition models. This step makes sure that employees are observed from their first year of 
working for an employer organization, the time when they are first at risk of leaving their 
employers for entrepreneurship.  
             These selection criteria resulted in an estimation sample of 647694	  individuals from 
323.847 married couples, and 2,995,018 individual-year observations.  
Dependent Variable 
Individual-level dependent variable  
             I follow previous research using similar datasets to measure transitions to 
entrepreneurship relying on a work status classification scheme that differentiates a variety of 
labor force attachments: (1) employment with established organizations, (2) unemployment, (3) 
not in the labor force, and (4) self-employment. Statistics Sweden recognizes both 
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unincorporated self-employment and incorporated self-employment.5 Founders of incorporated 
ventures appeared as employees whereas the incorporated ventures appeared as employers. 
However, I treated individuals who were founders of incorporated ventures as entrepreneurs, 
self-employed in incorporated firms. Furthermore, following Sørensen (2007), I restricted my 
definition of entrepreneurs based on the size of employees in the founding year of a new business 
and a direct transition from employment to entrepreneurship. First, I assume that individuals who 
are self-employed in newly founded firms are entrepreneurs. Second, if an individual become 
unemployed between employment in one year and self-employment in the next, I do not identify 
it as transition from employment into entrepreneurship. Unlike Nanda and Sørensen (2010) 
treating employees working for new firms that have less than 3 employees as entrepreneurs, I 
only define self-employed people as entrepreneurs because the jobs that employees have in 
newly founded small firms are still wage jobs, which are fundamentally different than founding 
one’s own new business.              
Couple-level dependent variable 
              Based on a wife and a husband’s entrepreneurial status (an entrepreneur or an 
employee), I code the co-entrepreneurship status for a spousal couple: neither of a spousal couple 
became an entrepreneur (=0, baseline), one of them, wife (=1) or husband (=2), and both of them 
(=3). 
Independent Variables 
Family-level variables: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The data is based both on the statement of income to be provided to tax authorities for all 
persons who received remuneration or other benefits from employers and the data on declared 
income of active trade.  
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            Married couples: the individual-level data differentiate 7 different marital statuses: 
unmarried, married, divorced, widow/widower, registered partner, separated partner, 
widow/widower (Partner). The spousal data include information on legal spouses and spouses 
who are not legally registered. I focus on married couples, couples registered as partners, and 
couples who are not registered but reported to the government as sambo (shortcut for 
sammanboende)-- couples living together but not married. In Swedish culture, sambo has a 
deeper meaning than cohabitation. It is used to describe two unmarried persons living together in 
a matrimonial manner, as a couple, in a joint household, without being married to each other 
(live-in partners). It has a similar meaning with the term Common Law husband / wife in English. 
Living together as “sambos” (samboförhållande – sambo relationship) is regulated in a law 
called “sambolagen” – “the law of cohabited living by couples”. The Swedish cohabitation law is 
officially referred to as; Act 2003:376. On all official application forms there are three boxes for 
civil status; unmarried, married, and “sambo”. “Sambo” in Sweden is both culturally and legally 
a stronger status of a spousal relationship than in other nations. Sambo with children is legally 
similar to married except for inheritance (i.e. ownership of house, apartment, etc). Because 
sambos with or without children can be commonly taxed so that they can be identified in the 
spousal data. 6  
          Motherhood and Fatherhood: is measured the total number of children in a household. 
Considering that childcare responsibilities are often associated with younger kids, I further 
differentiate the number of children in 6 different age groups: 0-3, 4-6, 7-10, 11- 15, 16-17, and 
18-19.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 About 15% of the sample of spousal couples are “sambos”. 
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         Deviant couples: measured by two indicators created based on husbands and wives’ salary 
earnings. The first one is a dummy variable for deviant couples, 1 if wives earn more than 
husbands, 0 if husbands earn more than wives. The second one is a continuous variable, the 
difference between husbands’ earnings and wives’ earnings. 
        Industry types: based on the 5 digit industry codes, I categorized 7 industry types: 
Agriculture and Fishing, Manufacture, Construction, Wholesale, Finance and Business, 
Education and Health, and other services.  
Individual level variables:  
             The data have two measures for education that can be converted to each other: First, the 
level of education: Six levels: (1) Compulsory schooling less than 9 years; (2) Compulsory 
schooling nine years (equivalent); (3) Secondary education; (4) Post-secondary education less 
than two years; (5) Post-secondary education two years or longer; (6) Graduate program. Second: 
years of education. Statistical Sweden and Swedish Council for Higher Education calculated 
years of education for each education code, which consists of information on the level of 
education and the type of education. I use years of education because it is more fine-grained 
measure than the level of education. 
           Seven other individual-level control variables are (1) age and age squared; (2) whether an 
individual received the highest degree in a university in Stockholm; (3) days of unemployment in 
a year; (4) gender; (5) whether an individual has created business before (a serial entrepreneur); 
(6) individual wage income; (7) fixed effects for the year when an employee was hired by the 
current employment. 
Firm-level variables:  
           Prior Entrepreneurial Experience of the Focal Individual’s Coworkers: is measured by 
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the number of the focal individual’s colleagues who had ever been self-employed in the 
preceding five years. Whereas the first indicator emphasizes the extent of entrepreneurial 
experience that co-workers had in the past five years, the alternative measure emphasizes the 
intensity of peer network ties with prior entrepreneurial experience. To test my hypothesis 
concerning peer influence of male employees and female employees, I created the two indicators 
for male and female employees having prior startup experience, respectively.        
          Seven other firm-level control variables are: (1) the number of employees; (2) average 
salaries of employees, (3) the percentage of female employees; (4) the county where a workplace 
is located; (5) Founding year of a firm; (6) whether a firm has any currently self-employed 
people; (7) country fixed effects. 
Analytical Strategy  
              My analytical strategy predicts a spousal couple’s entrepreneurial status by the wife and 
husband’s probability of becoming an entrepreneur that is estimated based on their own 
workplace conditions, and a set of household conditions that the spousal couple shares. The 
model is written as: 
             𝒖𝒊𝒋 = 𝜷𝒎𝑷𝒎 + 𝜷𝒘𝑷𝒘 + 𝜷𝒉𝑿𝒉 + 𝝐𝒊𝒋 
Where 𝛽!,𝛽! represent the influence of the man’s and the woman’s propensity to become an 
entrepreneur (predicted by their own employment conditions, 𝑃!  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑃!) on the couple’s joint 
entrepreneurial status. Whereas the neoclassical model implies that 𝛽!  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝛽! equivalently 
affect the spousal couple’s co-entrepreneurship, sociological predictions suggest that 𝛽! has a 
significant effect whereas 𝛽! does not. 
             I use logistic regression to estimate a wife’s and a husband’s propensity to become an 
entrepreneur based on the condition of their workplaces, and I use multinomial regression to 
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estimate a spousal couple’s joint entrepreneurship status. My estimate of each individual’s 
propensity to become an entrepreneur includes all individual-level control variables concerning 
employment (9 variables) and firm level control variables (6 variables). The estimated propensity 
based on employment and firm characteristics will be used as an indicator to assess who is the 
“lead” entrepreneur and who is the follower within a spousal couple.       
RESULTS 
            I first present descriptive results for individual employees, their families and their 
workplaces, I then test hypotheses regarding the conditions of workplaces and family households 
contexts on spousal couples’ entrepreneurial entry.  
Descriptive Results 
             Descriptive results of spousal couples’ transition into entrepreneurs show a strikingly 
low transition rate of entrepreneurship and a high unemployment rate for married Swedish 
people. Among the 647,694 individuals, 2.35 % of men and 1.26 % of women in the sample have 
become entrepreneurs within the observation period (8 to 5 years, depending on the initial year 
of under observation). A snapshot of the distribution of individuals’ employment status in a year 
during the observation period shows that on average about 80% of Swedish married men are 
employed in organizations, 1.6% of them are self-employed, and 18% of them are unemployed. 
Among married Swedish women, less than 1% of them are self-employed and roughly 20% are 
unemployed. The unusually high unemployment rates for married Swedish men and women in 
mid-1990s might be caused by the worst economic crisis in Sweden since the 1930s. “A 
restructuring of the tax system, in order to emphasize low inflation combined with an 
international economic slowdown in the early 1990s, caused the bubble to burst. Between 1990 
and 1993 GDP (in Sweden) went down by 5% and unemployment skyrocketed, causing the 
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worst economic crisis in Sweden since the 1930s. According to an analysis by George Berglund 
published in Computer Sweden in 1992, the investment level decreased drastically for 
information technology and computing equipment, except in the financial and banking sector, the 
part of the industry that created the crisis... Total employment fell by almost 10% during the 
crisis.” 7 
            I also examined descriptive results regarding entrepreneurial entry at the level of spousal 
couples. Among the 323847 spousal couples, 98.76 %  have no one ever transitioning to 
entrepreneurship during the observation period, and about 1.7%  of spouse couples have wife 
or/and husband becoming entrepreneurs. Among the spousal couples in which wives or/and 
husbands become entrepreneurs, 52% only have husband becoming entrepreneurs, 20% have 
wife becoming entrepreneurs, and 28% have husband and wife co-entrepreneurs. In theory, 
spouses may join entrepreneurship as employees, so I also examined the percentages of spouse 
employees for individuals who have become entrepreneurs. Only 3% of businesses ran by a 
spouse have the other person working for the businesses as an employee. These results suggest 
that husbands and wives are more likely to share similar statues in their businesses, both 
becoming self-employed, rather than having differentiated statuses as employers and employees.  
           Table 1 presents descriptive results of individuals, family households and workplaces. The 
typical individual in my sample is 43 years old, having 13 years of education, earning about 
$ 36,000 a year. Regarding spousal couples, the average number of children in the Swedish 
families in my sample is 1.62. The median number of children in a household is 2. By looking at 
the number of children in 6 different age groups, I found that 29% of spousal couples have kids 
younger than 3 years, and about 30% have kids aged between 4 and 6. These results suggest that 
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childcare responsibilities are highly relevant to most family households and may influence 
husbands and wives’ decisions regarding their employment. I also noticed that about 20% of the 
family households in the sample have never had children under the observation period. The 
variability of the number of children among households allows for an investigation of the effects 
of motherhood and fatherhood on spousal couples’ departures from market-based employment 
and their transitions into entrepreneurship.  
             With regard to firm characteristics, about 50% of individuals in my sample are employed 
in firms that have at least 5,677 employees. Half of individuals are employed in firms where at 
least 57% of employees are women. The average number of female employees in the focal 
individuals’ workplaces is larger than the average number of male employees in their workplaces. 
These results are consistent with previous research findings that labor-force participation rates 
for Swedish women are quite high, especially those in health and education industries (Mandel 
and Semyonov 2005; Mandel and Semyonov 2006). Table 1 also reports the characteristics of 
workplaces. About one third of these individuals are employed in workplaces in finance and 
business industries, another quarter are employed in workplaces in education and health 
industries, 16% are employed in manufacture firms, and 2 % are employed in fishing and other 
personal services. The descriptive results about work peers having prior startup experience 
suggest that men on average have been involved in creating new business longer than women.  
           In Table 2, I examine the association between husbands and wives’ personal attributes and 
the characteristics of their workplaces. First, the results show strong positive correlations 
between husbands and wives’ socioeconomic attainment. Consistent with previous findings on 
educational assortative marriage, the correlation between wives and husbands’ years of education 
is very high, 0.40 (Mare 1991; Schwartz and Mare 2005). Similarly, women’s salaries are 
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positively correlated with their husbands’, confirming previous results that income inequality 
among family households may be doubled as a result of educational assortative marriage and the 
rise of dual-earner families (Western et al. 2008). Second, husbands and wives tend to work in 
similar workplaces and industries. The correlations between husbands and wives’ employment in 
industries are particularly high when they work in manufacturing, finance & business, and 
education and health industries. Among all the firm-level characteristics, husbands and wives’ 
workplaces are most similar in employment size, and the number of employees with prior startup 
experience.  
             Figure 1 shows the distribution of the difference between husbands and wives’ salary 
income. Even though there is a strong pattern of educational assortative marriage among spousal 
couples in Sweden and the correlation between husbands and wives’ earning is quite large, the 
majority of spousal couples are male-breadwinner couples, and only 22 % of spousal couples 
have wives as the primary earners. In the 22 % of spousal couples that wives are the primary 
earners, on average, wives only make $ 14,000 a year more than their husbands. However, when 
men are the breadwinners, they generally make $ 30,000 a year more than their wives. These 
results are consistent with previous findings on gender deviance in earnings from analyzing data 
sets on American couples. Even though Sweden has been an exemplary corporatist society 
adopting public policies to rectify gender-stereotyped social roles for men and women, women 
are still making much less earnings than men in Sweden. 
Model Results 
             I conduct analysis by two steps. First, I run multilevel logistic regression to examine 
gender difference in the rate of entrepreneurial entry, testing the effect of workplace size and 
peer influence of coworkers who have prior entrepreneurial experience. I then use the predicted 
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propensity of entrepreneurial entry for each husband and wife to examine how their propensity 
affects joint entry, depending on household conditions that strengthen gender roles in spousal 
relationships.   
            In Table 3, the baseline model (Model 1) that only includes the gender variable and 
control variables shows that after controlling for industries, the odds for male employees to 
become entrepreneurs are 44 % (=exp[0.364]) significantly higher than the odds for women 
employees. But the size of gender difference I found is much smaller than what have been shown 
in studies of Danish employees and American employees which include every individuals, not 
just married individuals.  
            In model 2 and model 3, I examine the effect of peer influence and individual human 
capital on employees’ entrepreneurial entry. In model 2 where I added human capital variables, 
the odds ratio of the male coefficient almost remain the same, unchanged by controlling for 
human capital variables. The effects of human capital variables are quite consistent with previous 
findings. First, an individual’s rate of transition to entrepreneurship increases by 11% as his/her 
years of education increase by one year. Second, age has a curvilinear relationship with 
entrepreneurial entry, suggested by the positive effect of age and negative effect of age squared. 
But the coefficient of age squared is very small, leading to a slow deceleration of the age effect. 
Finally, I also included the dummy variable, being employed in an organization versus being 
unemployed, in Model 2. The result suggests that employment substantially increases an 
individual’s chance to become an entrepreneur than unemployment. Perhaps because the 
Swedish welfare state provides a safety net to citizens so that unemployment rarely leads to 
individuals’ transitions to entrepreneurship.  
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             Model 3 includes two additional variables, the natural logarithm of the number of 
employees and percentage of women employees. Both of the variables have negative effects on 
employees’ likelihood of entering to entrepreneurship, but the natural logarithm of the number of 
employees has a much stronger effect. An increase of 10 employees leads to a reduction of 74% 
in an employee’s chance to become an entrepreneur. This result confirms previous finding that 
bureaucratic organizations constrain employees’ chances of discovering startup opportunities 
because they “influence the attitudes and mental dispositions of their employees in ways that 
make them less likely to enter entrepreneurship, and work in bureaucracies may hinder 
development of the skills necessary for successful entrepreneurship and may therefore 
lower the expected value of entrepreneurial opportunities.”(Sørensen 2007). I also noticed that 
after controlling firm size, the odds ratio of gender in entrepreneurial entry substantially dropped 
from 44% to 6%. It suggests that Swedish women are less likely to become entrepreneurs than 
their male counterparts largely due to the fact that Swedish women are more likely to work in the 
public sector and health & education industries which are predominately large firms. 
             In hypothesis 1, I proposed that the differential returns to men and women’s exposures to 
entrepreneurial peers exist among employees in established organizations. Results for this 
hypothesis are presented in Model 4- 6 in Table 4. I added the number of entrepreneurial peers in 
Model 4 but I split the variable into the number of female entrepreneurial peers and the number 
of male entrepreneurial peers in Model 5. Results in Model 4 suggest that the number of work 
peers having previous startup experience has significantly positive effect on employees’ 
transition into entrepreneurship.  Results from Model 5, where I separated the number of female 
entrepreneurial peers and the number of male entrepreneurial peers, show surprising findings: the 
number of female entrepreneurial peers seems has much larger effect on increasing employees’ 
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entrepreneurial entry than the number of male entrepreneurial peers. In Model 6, I added the 
interaction of gender and the two peer influence variables.  Results in Model 6 show that men 
employees are much more likely to become entrepreneurs than women when there are more 
work peers with prior startup experience at workplaces, regardless of whether these 
entrepreneurial peers are men or women. This result supports the hypothesis that men and 
women receive differential returns from being exposed to work peers having prior startup 
experience.  
            Next, I examine whether the magnitude of gender inequality in entrepreneurship due to 
the workplace size and work peers would be attenuated by strengthened gender expectations 
associated with motherhood and fatherhood. Following previous research, I have argued that in 
the field of entrepreneurship, motherhood shapes co-workers’ expectations for women’s heavy 
responsibility for childcare and their lower interest in starting new businesses. In addition, 
childcare responsibility at home consumes women’s time that could be spent with work peers in 
their employer organizations, and thus constrains their exposure to people who started new 
business before. By contrast, fatherhood is associated with more ambitions for earning household 
income and expectations that men become more responsible for their behaviors in the labor 
market. Thus I expected to find a more pronounced gender difference in the effect of peer 
influence on men and women’s probabilities to become entrepreneurs. I tested this hypothesis by 
first including the number of children in each age group and the propensity of entering into 
entrepreneurship for a husband and a wife, estimated based on workplace conditions. Because 
the couple-level dependent variable has 4 categories, no one has become an entrepreneur, a wife 
has become an entrepreneur, a husband has become an entrepreneur, and both, I use a 
multinomial logistic regression to test the conditions under which husbands and wives become 
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entrepreneurs together. Because the probability that an individual becomes an entrepreneur is 
small, I increased the unit of the two propensity variables by 100 times for easier interpretation 
of the results.  
             In Model 1 of Table 4, the results show that in general spousal couples are much more 
likely to have at least one person becoming entrepreneurs when there are more children younger 
than 3 at home. The effect of having more children younger than 3 is stronger on spousal couples’ 
joint entrepreneurship than either husband or wife entering into entrepreneurship. In particular, a 
spousal couple’s joint chance of becoming entrepreneurs increases by 43% when the number of 
children younger than 3 increases by 1, but the probability that only the husband becomes an 
entrepreneur increased by 5% and the probability that only the wife becomes an entrepreneur 
increased by 18% as the number of children younger than 3 increases by 1.   
            Table 5 presents results testing hypotheses 3, which predicts that gender deviance 
neutralization in spousal couples affects their entries into entrepreneurship. I proposed that in the 
setting of new businesses where tasks are male-stereotyped, deviant couples in which husbands 
earn less in the labor market than their wives will avoid working together in creating new 
ventures so as not to not further threaten their masculinity and femininity (Schneider 2012: 1033). 
Because stereotypical startups are highly profitable, creating new businesses may be seen as a 
way that allows for the husbands to correct for their gender deviance in earnings. The three 
coefficients compare the three groups of spousal couples that have at least one entrepreneurial 
person and the control group that neither of the husband and wife has become an entrepreneur.  I 
did additional analysis testing spousal couples’ joint entrepreneurship and the other two types of 
entrepreneurial entry (only one person becoming an entrepreneur). My results support that in 
dual-earner married couples, gender deviance in socioeconomic attainment in the labor market 
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would deter husbands and wives’ joint involvement in new businesses. In particular, deviant 
couples are most likely to have husband becoming entrepreneurs, and least likely to have wife 
becoming entrepreneurs. The chance that husbands and wives both transitioning 
entrepreneurship is between the two.   
            A further examination of the industries where new businesses are created suggest that 
deviant couples are less likely than normal couples to simultaneously become entrepreneurs, 
regardless of whether the couples are starting new businesses in traditional industries or not.  
DISCUSSION 
            My study provides strong evidence for the effects of social networks at places and 
family-embedded gender logic on shaping gender inequality in entrepreneurship. Unlike 
previous research examining family household conditions and organizational conditions 
respectively, I examine both family context and organizational context to explain gender 
inequality in entrepreneurial entry. My results show that women employees are less likely than 
their male counterparts in employer organizations to become entrepreneurs, because they benefit 
less from peer influence at work and they face stronger normative barriers in the household 
context to entering into entrepreneurship.  
            An important organizational mechanism concerning peer influence is that women 
employees have less access to work peers who have had startup experience. Two conditions 
allow this mechanism to disadvantage female employees in transitioning into entrepreneurship: 
First, sex segregation in interpersonal networks among employees; Second, there are more male 
employees in workplaces that have previous startup experience. Even when there are same 
numbers of male and female employees having prior startup experience, women are still less 
likely to learn information and skills from their entrepreneurial peers because of the differential 
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returns to men and women’s social ties to their work peers. To the extent that there are more 
male employees having startup experience in workplaces, gender inequality in entrepreneurship 
is self-perpetuated as some entrepreneurs become employed in established organizations again. 
They pass more knowledge and information to their male peers than female peers. It means that 
sex segregation in personal networks among work peers at established organizations and male-
dominance in entrepreneurship jointly perpetuate gender inequality in entrepreneurship. This 
finding suggests that established organizations serve as conduit for job mobility and the context 
for sustaining inequality generated in the process of employment mobility.   
           I also found that family household conditions influence men and women’s entries into 
entrepreneurship by moderating individuals’ exposures to peer influence by three mechanisms: 
expectations associated with motherhood and fatherhood, the male-dominance logic in husbands 
and wives’ mutual influence, and gender deviance neutralization of spousal couples. First, 
motherhood and fatherhood shape the work peers’ expectations for men and women’s 
probabilities to become entrepreneurs, and their own self-fulfillment of responsibilities for work 
and family. Second, knowledge spillover about startups between husbands and wives is driven 
by a male- dominant logic rather than a gender-neutral logic so that wives would face normative 
barriers to convincing their husbands to join them for creating new businesses. My results 
support my argument that whereas peer influence at husbands’ workplaces affects spousal 
couples’ joint involvement in entrepreneurship, peer influence at wives’ workplace predicts only 
wives’ involvement in entrepreneurship. It means that wives’ possibilities to become 
entrepreneurs are highly dependent on their husbands’ chances to become entrepreneurs, whereas 
husbands’ entrepreneurial status is relatively independent of their wives’.   
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          Third, the gender deviance neutralization mechanism also applies in the setting of new 
businesses. Because entrepreneurial tasks are male-stereotyped, deviant couples in which 
husbands earn less in the labor market than their wives will avoid working together in creating 
new ventures so as not to not further threaten their masculinity and femininity (Schneider 2012: 
1033). Because stereotypical startups are highly profitable, creating new businesses is likely to 
been seen as a way for the husbands to correct for their gender deviance in earnings. While 
deviant husbands take the opportunity to demonstrate that they earn more household income, 
deviant wives choose to stick to their market-based employment so as not to violate husbands’ 
independent involvement in new businesses. My analyses of the married couples in Sweden 
provide strong evidence that gender deviance in socioeconomic attainment in the labor market 
affects husbands and wives’ involvement in new businesses. This finding extends the literature 
on gender deviance into a field that has rarely been studied. 
CONCLUSION  
             Sociologists have long recognized family as an important institution in modern societies, 
especially when it comes to explaining social disparities between men and women. First, 
scholars taking a structuralism view have theorized family as a basic unit for understanding 
social stratification because it distributes income from individuals’ employment in the labor 
market among family members (Parsons and Bales 1955). Second, scholars taking a cultural 
perspective have emphasized that family is the context under which cultural beliefs about 
gendered become perpetuated and sustained (Berk 1985; Ridgeway 2011). Third, researchers 
taking an interactional perspective have posited that family is one of the most important contexts 
within which individuals engage in gender-typical activities to display their masculinity and 
femininity. Despite the recognition of the importance of family in shaping gender inequality, 
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sociologists have not systematically examined the effects of family in shaping gender inequality 
when husbands and wives are jointly involved in economic production. As Martinize and Aldrich 
(2014) have argued, “sociologists tended to separate the study of production, mostly performed 
through firms in modern society, from the study of reproduction, involving studies of the family 
as a socializing and stabilizing institution” (Yanagisako and Collier 2004). In my research, I 
build the connection between studies on economic production and social reproduction by 
examining the joint effects of workplaces and family on spousal couples’ involvement in 
entrepreneurship.   
             I developed my theoretical framework by synthesizing the literature on employee 
entrepreneurs, the literature on family businesses, and the literature on gender inequality. Recent 
studies on employee entrepreneurs have demonstrated that established organizations have 
substantial effects on entrepreneurship (Audia and Rider 2006; Sørensen 2007; Sørensen and 
Fassiotto 2011). Research on family businesses has demonstrated that family households are 
influential for shaping entrepreneurship, as manifest in the remnants of household-based 
production in the small business sector of the economy, i.e., family members collectively engage 
in direct cooperation in family enterprises (Aldrich and Cliff 2003; Budig 2006a; Carr 1996; 
Sanders and Nee 1996). To unpack the mechanisms by which social dynamics at workplaces and 
gender relations at home jointly shape gender inequality in entrepreneurship, I simultaneously 
investigate wives and husbands’ transitions into entrepreneurship, taking into account their 
separate employment in the labor market and their joint household conditions. 
           My analyses of married working adults in Sweden from 1994 to 2002 suggest that 
women’s chances to become entrepreneurs are constrained by their access to entrepreneurial 
peers at workplaces. Meanwhile, the differential effects of work peers on men and women’s 
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likelihood of becoming entrepreneurs are substantially moderated by men’s dominance in 
spousal relationships, the relative comparative advantage of spousal couples’ earnings, and the 
presence of children in the households. My results show that family-embedded gender logic 
interacts with social dynamics at workplaces to shape gender inequality in entrepreneurship.   
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Table 1. Descriptive Results of Individuals, Family Households and Firms 
Variable  Mean Median Std Dev 
Husband-to-wife income difference ($ 1,000) 20.12 15.47 44.24 
 # of Kids aged ( 0 – 3 )  0.29 0 0.54 
 # of Kids aged (4 -6)  0.3 0 0.52 
 # of Kids aged (7-10)  0.38 0 0.62 
 # of Kids aged (11-15)  0.35 0 0.63 
 # of Kids aged (16-17)  0.1 0 0.31 
 # of Kids aged (18-19)  0.19 0 0.47 
 Total # of Children  1.6 2 1.1 
Year of Getting Married 
   <=1994 84.43 
  1995 5.6 
  1996 5.08 
  1997 4.9 
   Age  42.79 41 10.38 
Years of Education 12.65 12.5 2.54 
 # of Days in Unemployment in a Year  11.29 0 42.95 
 Salary Income ($ 1,000) 36.13 31.7 36.53 
Have prior startup exp 0.03 0 0.17 
Firm Level 
    # of Employees  5,677 1,035 11,034 
 # of Male Employees  1,802 318 3,676 
 # of Female Employees  3,875 541 8,530 
Percent of Female Employees 0.54 0.57 0.28 
Avg. Salary Income of Employees   32 30 15 
Number of currently Self-employed 0 0 1 
 # of Employees having Startup Exp   56 14 106 
 # of Male Employees having Startup Exp  21 5 38 
 # of Female Employees having Startup Exp  35 5 74 
 Female Employees' Years of Startup Exp   0.42 0.42 0.34 
 Male Employees' Years of Startup Exp   1.79 2.32 1.3 
 Agriculture & Fishing  0.02 
  
 Manufacture  0.17 
  
 Construction  0.03 
  
 Wholesale  0.07 
  
 Finance & Business  0.33 
  
 Education & Health  0.34 
  
 Other Service  0.04     
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Table 2. Correlations of Husbands and Wives' Personal Characteristics and Workplace 
Characteristics 
Firm Characteristics 
  # of Female Employees  0.2 
 # of Male Employees  0.3 
# of Employees having Startup Exp   0.20 
Employees' Years of Startup Exp  0.12 
# of Male Employees having Startup Exp  0.21 
Male Employees' Years of Startup Exp   0.13 
# of Female Employees having Startup Exp  0.20 
Female Employees' Years of Startup Exp   0.13 
 # of Employees  0.20 
Personal Characteristics 
 Salary Income 0.20 
Transition to Entrepreneurs 0.11 
Years of Education 0.40 
Industries 
  Agriculture & Fishing  0.1 
 Manufacture  0.2 
 Construction  0.1 
 Wholesale  0.1 
 Finance & Business  0.2 
 Education & Health  0.2 
 Other Service  0.2 
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Table 3. Gender Difference in Entrepreneurial Entry: Effects of Individual level and Firm Level 
Conditions   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Parameter B P B P B P 
Intercept -5.371 <.0001 -10.738 <.0001 -9.835 <.0001 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.103) 
 Male (=1) 0.364 <.0001 0.363 <.0001 0.058 <.0001 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.008) 
 # of self-employed* Male 
      
       Years of Education 
  
0.104 <.0001 0.104 <.0001 
   
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 Age 
  
0.188 <.0001 0.173 <.0001 
   
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 Age Squared 
  
-0.002 <.0001 -0.002 <.0001 
   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 Salary Income ($ 1,000) 
  
-0.027 <.0001 -0.011 <.0001 
   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 Have prior startup exp 
  
3.765 <.0001 2.709 <.0001 
   
(0.012) 
 
(0.014) 
 Employed in an Org  
  
1.584 <.0001 3.242 <.0001 
(Ref=unemployed) 
  
(0.032) 
 
(0.034) 
 Log num of employees  
    
-0.579 <.0001 
     
(0.004) 
 Percentage of Women 
Employees 
    
0.000 <.0001 
     
(0.000) 
 (Ref=Other Services) 
       Agriculture & Fishing  2.438 <.0001 1.038 <.0001 1.178 <.0001 
 
(0.021) 
   
(0.036) 
 Manufacture  -0.244 <.0001 -0.687 <.0001 -0.337 <.0001 
 
(0.023) 
   
(0.033) 
 Construction 1.075 <.0001 0.216 <.0001 -0.256 <.0001 
 
(0.026) 
   
(0.036) 
 Wholesale  1.121 <.0001 0.216 <.0001 -0.109 0.0004 
 
(0.021) 
   
(0.031) 
 Finance & Business  0.853 <.0001 0.170 <.0001 0.303 <.0001 
 
(0.016) 
   
(0.028) 
 Education & Health  -0.178 <.0001 -1.019 <.0001 0.735 <.0001 
 
(0.021) 
   
(0.032) 
 AIC 408085 
 
293621 
 
234954 
 -2 Log L 408069 
 
293593 
 
234922 
 obs 3243606  3243606  3243606  
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Table 4. Gender Difference in Entrepreneurial Entry: Effects of Individual level and Firm Level Conditions  
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Parameter B P B P B P 
Intercept -9.712 <.0001 -9.555 <.0001 -9.553 <.0001 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.105) 
 Male (=1) 0.114 <.0001 0.164 <.0001 0.094 <.0001 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 # of self-employed* Male 
    
0.065 <.0001 
     
(0.005) 
 Log # of women employees having prior ent exp* Male 
    
0.019 0.1856 
     
(0.014) 
 Log # of men employees having prior ent exp* Male 
    
0.031 0.0482 
     
(0.016) 
 Years of Education 0.102 <.0001 0.098 <.0001 0.097 <.0001 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 Age 0.174 <.0001 0.170 <.0001 0.170 <.0001 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 Age Squared -0.002 <.0001 -0.002 <.0001 -0.002 <.0001 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 Salary Income ($ 1,000) -0.011 <.0001 -0.009 <.0001 -0.009 <.0001 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 Have prior startup exp 2.117 <.0001 2.241 <.0001 2.237 <.0001 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.017) 
 Employed in an Org  3.223 <.0001 3.337 <.0001 3.391 <.0001 
(Ref=unemployed) (0.035) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.035) 
 Log num of employees  -0.908 <.0001 -0.965 <.0001 -0.962 <.0001 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 Percentage of Women Employees 0.000 <.0001 0.000 <.0001 0.000 <.0001 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 # of currently self-employed 0.150 <.0001 0.179 <.0001 0.152 <.0001 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
 Log # of employees having prior ent exp 0.873 <.0001 
    
 
(0.015) 
     Log # of men employees having prior ent exp 
  
0.374 <.0001 0.332 <.0001 
   
(0.016) 
 
(0.017) 
 Log # of Women employees having prior ent exp 
  
0.857 <.0001 0.888 <.0001 
(Ref=Other Services) 
  
(0.015) 
 
(0.016) 
 Construction -0.313 <.0001 -0.264 <.0001 -0.263 <.0001 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.038) 
 Wholesale  -0.160 <.0001 -0.143 <.0001 -0.141 <.0001 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.032) 
 Finance & Business  0.111 0.0001 0.163 <.0001 0.164 <.0001 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.029) 
 Education & Health  0.387 <.0001 0.284 <.0001 0.309 <.0001 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.034) 
 AIC 226229 
 
224290 
 
224008 
 -2 Log L 226193 
 
224252 
 
223964 
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TABLE 5. Spousal Couples' Transitions into Entrepreneurship: 1949 - 2002 in Sweden (Obs=1,621,803 couples) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Parameter Only Husband Only Wife Both Only Husband Only Wife Both 
 
B P B P B P B P B P B P 
Intercept -5.962 <.0001 -7.157 <.0001 -9.103 <.0001 -5.864 <.0001 -7.228 <.0001 -9.057 <.0001 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.094) 
 
Deviant Couples* 
      
0.287 <.0001 -0.136 <.0001 0.122 0.0255 
       
(0.012) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.055) 
 
# Kids             
age ( 0 – 3 )  0.046 0.0266 0.167 <.0001 0.355 <.0001 0.102 <.0001 0.144 0.0002 0.379 <.0001 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.080) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.081) 
 
age (4 -6)  0.137 <.0001 0.225 <.0001 -0.071 0.4645 0.154 <.0001 0.213 <.0001 -0.061 0.5317 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.097) 
 
age (7-10)  0.069 0.0007 -0.010 0.8056 -0.171 0.0606 0.083 <.0001 -0.019 0.6295 -0.164 0.0721 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.091) 
 
age (11-15)  -0.062 0.004 -0.030 0.4613 -0.261 0.0069 -0.055 0.0107 -0.037 0.3577 -0.256 0.008 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.097) 
 
age (16-17)  -0.104 0.0142 -0.310 0.0003 -0.348 0.0508 -0.107 0.0113 -0.318 0.0002 -0.339 0.0564 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.178) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.178) 
 
age (18-19)  0.025 0.352 0.020 0.6981 -0.317 0.0091 0.018 0.5119 0.017 0.7423 -0.318 0.0089 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.121) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.121) 
 
Wife's Propensity -0.001 <.0001 0.002 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 -0.001 <.0001 0.002 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
Husband's 
propensity 0.001 <.0001 -0.001 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 -0.001 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Note: A comparison of the three deviant coefficients suggests that they are all significantly different from each other.  
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CHAPTER THREE: BUILDING ROUTINES IN EMERGING ORGANIZATIONS: THE 
EFFECTS OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES’ PRIOR WORKPLACES 
              Understanding the process of organizational emergence has long been important for 
theorizing organizations. Since the 1960s, organizational scholars have begun to theorize the 
conditions that shape the foundings of organizations. A classic approach, typified by perspectives 
in the entrepreneurship literature, emphasizes entrepreneurial founders and their personal 
attributes (Aldrich and Waldinger 1990). An alternative approach, typified by theories in the 
sociology literature, focuses on environmental contexts in which organizations are founded 
(Aldrich 1979; Johnson 2007; Steinmetz and Wright 1989; Stinchcombe 1965). Over the past 
four decades, as research into organizational emergence became more developed along these two 
lines, researchers have begun to pay more attention to the connections between the founders and 
the environmental context.  
             Among the many attempts linking entrepreneurial founders and their founding contexts, 
a fruitful stream of research has been investigating the genealogical process of organizations 
emergence in which new firms originate from existing organizations (Agarwal et al. 2004; Audia 
and Rider 2010; Brittain and Freeman 1980; Freeman 1986; Klepper 2001). In a genealogical 
framework, Phillips (2002) argued that entrepreneurs’ knowledge about how to run businesses is 
largely obtained (consciously or unconsciously) from their prior work experiences. Based on the 
observation that the vast majority of entrepreneurs have had work experiences in established 
organizations, Sørensen and Fassiotto (2011) theorized that “organizations are fonts of 
entrepreneurship” such that the components and tools that entrepreneurs draw on to build new 
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firms are shaped by their employer organizations. A core proposition regarding the genealogical 
process of organizational emergence is that entrepreneurs transfer knowledge and routines from 
previous workplaces to build their new firms. Empirical evidence in support of the close 
connections between founders’ previous workplaces and their new firms has been found in 
research on a variety of groups, including scientist entrepreneurs (Stuart and Ding 2006; Zucker 
and Darby 2006), executive managers(Sørensen 1999; Stuart and Sorenson 2003b), and 
employees of various industries (Audia and Rider 2010; Sorenson and Audia 2000).    
              While research tapping into the genealogical process of organizational emergence has 
contributed to the middle-level theories bridging organizational actors and the social contexts, 
two questions remain underexplored. First, scholars have neglected organizational actors who 
might be minor figures compared to entrepreneurial founders, but nonetheless are involved in 
shaping new firms (Ruef 2010: Chapter4). One of the groups of actors who have been rarely 
studied by previous research is the group of employees. In theoretical development, scholars 
have focused on entrepreneurial founders, assuming the founders to be the primary (or the solo) 
forces driving the development of new organizations (Alvarez and Barney 2005; Bird 1988; 
Shane 2002). In empirical studies, most researchers have treated initial hiring and subsequent 
recruitment as temporary outcomes achieved by startups (Barron et al. 1994; Greve 2008). 
Indeed, organizational emergence is a process in which entrepreneurial founders take on 
elements from their contexts to construct organizations (Aldrich 2009; Johnson 2007). A crucial 
element that entrepreneurs draw on from their environment is employees (Aldrich and Ruef 2006: 
93; Scott and Davis 2007: 152). Once recruited, employees join the founders to create new 
organizations and exert influences on organizations’ structures and performances. Even though 
employers may hire employees that resemble workers in the employers’ previous jobs, the 
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effects of transferring routines may be contingent on the broader environmental contexts.  
             Second, scholars have paid little attention to the contingencies existing at multiple levels 
that may moderate the effect of transferred routines. Although researchers have convincingly 
argued that entrepreneurs transfer routines from existing organizations to their new firms 
(Phillips 2002), less effort has been directed at revealing the conditions under which the 
transferred routines effectively improve new firms’ performance. A few researchers have 
suggested that the routines that entrepreneurs learn from parent firms might not be favorable for 
the new firms, under scenarios when there is competition between them and when the routines 
had led to the failure of parent firms (Phillips 2005; Sørensen 1999). However, a more nuanced 
understanding of the conditions under which routines influence new firms’ performance requires 
a systematic depiction of the environmental conditions under which new firms are founded.  
            In this chapter, I address the two underexplored areas by investigating how founders and 
their recruited employees jointly create new businesses, contingent on the founding context of 
new businesses. I argue that an important dimension of developing routines and delineating 
boundaries is manifest in entrepreneurs’ selections of employees from their local labor markets 
(Scott 2008). Once recruited, employees join the founders to create new organizations and exert 
influences on organizations’ structures and performances. Even though entrepreneurs largely 
follow the blueprints they learned from prior employer organizations to recruit employees, the 
effects of transferring routines may be contingent on the founding conditions surrounding the 
new businesses.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
             Organizational scholars have conceptualized routines as grammars of actions in 
organizations (Nelson and Winter 1982; Pentland 2003; Pentland and Feldman 2005). For 
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organizations that are still on their way to become fledging entities, routines largely determine 
the resources that entrepreneurs take on from their environments and the procedures that 
entrepreneurs use to construct new firms (Aldrich and Yang 2012). In early works on 
entrepreneurship, scholars have implicitly emphasized that routines regulate the interplay 
between entrepreneurs and their environment. Following Aldrich (Aldrich 1979),  McKelvey 
(1982: 115) defined an organization as a “myopically purposeful boundary-maintaining activity 
system…in environments imposing particular constraints”. Similarly, Katz and Gartner (1988) 
argued that entrepreneurs engage in patterned actions involving resources, boundary-developing, 
and social exchanges with other actors in their environments.  
             More explicitly, Aldrich and Ruef (2006) theorized routines as one of the three important 
dimensions of organizations. In their three-dimensional framework, while resources refers to the 
building blocks of organizations (Katz and Gartner 1988; Wernerfelt 1984), boundaries reflect 
the extent to which emerging organizations become independent identities (Santos and 
Eisenhardt 2005), routines are the ways by which organizational actors accomplish work, 
including processing resources and developing boundaries (Feldman and Pentland 2003; Nelson 
and Winter 1982). This understanding of organizations and their routines is compatible with 
organizational theories that view organizations as open-natural systems subject to environmental 
influences (Scott and Davis 2007: 115). In line with these theories, I view routines as an 
important dimension of organizational emergence, and I emphasize the aspect of routines that 
shapes the ways by which entrepreneurial founders take on resources from environments and 
build organizations’ boundaries (Amburgey et al. 1993; Hannan and Freeman 1984; Nelson and 
Winter 1982; Phillips 2002).   
 Routines as Grammars of Action: Collective Nature and Context-dependent    
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              Organizations’ blueprints are largely manifest in their employment systems and 
governance structures of their affiliated members (Baron et al. 1996; Baron et al. 1999). 
Population ecology and resource dependence theory emphasize that routines are the ways 
entrepreneurs use to mobilize resources, and that employees are among the most important 
resources that new organizations need to employ from their environments (Baron 1984; Feldman 
and Pentland 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). From the institutionalism perspective that 
emphasizes routines as the blueprints by which new firms construct boundaries, the most crucial 
components that new organizations rely on to compose their identities are employees (Kalev et al. 
2006; Santos and Eisenhardt 2005). As resources and affiliated members representing firms’ 
identities, employees are elements taken on by entrepreneurs from their environment but become 
part of the new organizations once they are recruited. Therefore, to understand the role of 
routines in shaping the interplay between emerging organizations and their environments, I pay 
close attention to the process of developing routines involving employees.  
            During organizational emergence, routines lead to recurrent patterns of actions but also 
evolve from stable sequences of actors’ interactions (Becker 2004; Zollo and Winter 2002). The 
simultaneous process of developing routines for new businesses consists of two complementary 
stages: transferring routines from existing organizations and collectively enacting routines. At 
the first stage, entrepreneurs transfer routines from existing organizations to new firms (Phillips 
2002). They not only carry over knowledge regarding organizational structures but also transfer 
knowledge about what particular kinds of employees they should recruit. At the second stage, as 
new members are recruited to new businesses, routines are developed and reproduced as group 
members make collective efforts. Two properties of routines, one at each stage -- the 
incompleteness property of transferring routines and the collective nature of enacting routines -- 
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are important for my theorizing of the conditions under which routines have positive effects on 
new firms. 
Collective Nature of Routines 
             Some scholars have explicitly differentiated individual habits and skills from 
organizational routines. Unlike habits and skills possessed by individuals, routines are collective 
phenomena that involve multiple actors (Becker 2004; Kogut and Zander 1992; Nelson and 
Winter 1982). At the beginning of the organizational founding process, entrepreneurs transfer the 
knowledge and skills they learned from previous workplaces to the new firms. They also carry 
over some abstract notions of organizational forms to the new firms. In the process of building 
new organizations, specific personnel need to be selected to fill the positions in organizational 
structure, and interactions of group members are required in transforming individual previous 
experience and knowledge to organizational properties (Cohen et al. 1996; Winter 1994). As 
Zollo and Winter (2002: 341) have argued, “important collective learning happens when 
individuals express their opinions and beliefs, engage in constructive confrontations and 
challenge each other’s viewpoints.” Founders and employees’ collaborative behaviors and 
exchanges of opinions may help founders build organizations’ routines.  
            Empirical studies have provided some evidence revealing the importance of group-level 
interactions (Argyris 1999; Edmondson et al. 2001). For example, by studying routine 
disruptions, Weick (1990) demonstrated that organizational routines would be disrupted if 
individuals simply act in a personal manner rather than cooperate with others. Similarly, by 
studying technology implementation in hospitals, Edmondson et al. (2001) showed that 
collective learning among team members is the key to successfully developing routines in 
existing organizations. Following the same logic, employees’ cooperation with founders may 
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largely determine the extent to which founders’ blueprints can be successfully transplanted in 
new firms.  
Context-dependence of the Effects of Routines 
             When organizational routines are transferred across contexts, they are often incompletely 
specified, i.e. missing certain original components. As indicated by the notions of “scaffolded 
action” (Clark 1997) and “situated action” (Suchman 1987), routines are embedded in an 
organization and thus are specific to the original context. When transferred from the original 
context to a new organization, several kinds of specificity restrict the complete transfer of 
routines, such as historical specificity (Barney 1991; Hodgson 2001), local specificity (Simon 
1976), and relation specificity (Dyer and Singh 1998). Due to the constraining effects of these 
specificities, the limited transferability of routines across different contexts makes a universal 
best practice virtually nonexistent. As a consequence, only local best solutions can be possibly 
achieved. Because routines can only be imperfectly transferred, Kogut and Zander (1992) argued 
that a combinative capability -- synthesizing transferred knowledge but also learning and 
creating new knowledge -- is crucial for organizations to succeed in competitive environments.  
            Given the collective nature and context-dependent property of routines,  founders’ 
transfer of the blueprints from their previous workplaces only constitutes an initial part of the 
organizational emergence process. The extent to which effective routines can be developed for 
new organizations is influenced by (1) founder-employee cooperation in the workplaces, and (2) 
the founding context of the new firm.  
HYOTHESES 
            Several conditions matter substantially for the extent to which locally optimal solutions 
can be achieved to build routines in new firms. The first set of conditions concerns the extent to 
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which entrepreneurial founders recruit employees with whom they can collectively build and 
enact routines. From a learning perspective, routinization and implementation would be faster 
and easier when social actors have developed a common perspective, expectations, and 
approaches to problem solving from prior joint work experience (Beckman 2006). This argument 
leads to my first hypothesis regarding the positive effect of founders’ joint or similar work 
experience on developing routines effective for new firms’ performance. I propose that a new 
business’ performance is the best, intermediate, and lowest, when founders and employees are 
from the same prior workplaces, similar workplaces and workplaces that are very different. It 
means that: 
H1. The more similar founders’ previous workplaces are to employees’ previous workplaces, the 
better performance new firms will have. 
             The second set of conditions concerns the extent to which members’ workplaces and the 
new firms are under somewhat homogeneous environments (Becker 2004; Hill and Hwang 2006; 
Kogut and Zander 1992; Kogut and Zander 1993). Gathmann and Schoenberg (2007) noted that 
the concept of task specific skills is different from that of occupation-specific skills and implies 
that highly skilled workers retain their advantages only if they move into new positions making 
use of such skills. Their view suggests that nascent entrepreneurs benefit the most when they 
attempt to start businesses in industries where they already have a substantial depth of experience. 
While nascent entrepreneurs’ prior industry experience may help new businesses succeed their 
very early lifetime, employees’ prior industry experience may matter more for new firms’ 
subsequent performance.   
I propose a set of two hypotheses: 
H2a. The more similar the industrial contexts of founders’ previous workplaces are to the new 
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firm, the stronger the hypothesized effect in H1 of the effect of employer-employee prior 
workplace matching.  
H2b. The more similar the industrial contexts of employees’ previous workplaces are to the new 
firm, the stronger the hypothesized effect in H1 of the effect of employer-employee prior 
workplace matching.  
A caveat of the causal effect of founders and employees’ joint/similar workplaces 
           The positive effect of founders and employees’ joint or similar workplaces may reflect 
founders’ capability of successfully recruiting employees from same or similar workplaces. 
Previous research has suggested that the practice of recruiting employees for new businesses is 
laden with complex challenges that involve competition with established organizations (Aldrich 
and Fiol 1994; Stinchcombe 1965). Because skills to a large extent are industry-specific, new 
ventures often compete with establishments in the same industries for employees equipped with 
the right skills (Bhide 2000; Caves 1998; Davis et al. 2007).  
          At least three disadvantages of new firms hinder their early efforts to attract scarce labor. 
First, emerging organizations suffer a heightened risk of failure because many of them have 
insufficient resources, lack legal recognition of potential customers and favorable terms with 
suppliers (Aldrich and Auster 1986; Kim and Aldrich 2011; Ruef 2002; Singh et al. 1986; 
Stinchcombe 1965). New firms’ precarious life chances impose risks on employees’ job 
prospects, and raise potential employees’ suspicion regarding their employment in new firms 
when compared to their jobs in established workplaces (Stuart and Sorenson 2005). Second, the 
well-established “firm size wage effect” (FSWE) in research on social stratification posits that 
larger organizations offer better pay than small firms, most of which are newly founded ventures 
(Hollister 2004; Kalleberg and Buren 1996). It suggests that new firms are endowed with limited 
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financial capital, thus face great challenge to offer better pay in attracting skilled employees. 
Third, new firms have flatter structures and less-defined division of labor, so that employees in 
small firms encounter not only economic insecurity but also a limited chance of upward mobility 
(Kalleberg 2011). The three disadvantages constrain new businesses’ chances to recruit ideal 
employees. From the standpoint of entrepreneurs, under the condition that intense competition 
for employees constrains their opportunity to recruit skilled labor, entrepreneurs are predisposed 
toward tapping into their social networks to recruit employees from their direct or indirect 
personal ties. It means that, by default, entrepreneurs prefer hiring from their own networks.  
             Given entrepreneurs’ preferences for recruiting employees from their previous 
workplaces, their chances of successful recruitment are dependent on their work peers’ 
perception of their new businesses’ success. In a market-based exchange system, an information 
asymmetry exists between employers and employees (Stuart and Sorenson 2005). Whereas 
entrepreneurs have superior knowledge about their startups, employees know better about their 
own skills and abilities. Such an information asymmetry increases the risks for both 
entrepreneurs and potential employees because entrepreneurs may intentionally overstate the job 
prospect that they could provide whereas potential employees may exaggerate how much their 
skills would benefit startups’ performance (Akerlof 1970; Amit et al. 1990). However, when 
entrepreneurs place their search for employees in the context of their prior workplaces, prior 
connections between them and their coworkers and the shared overlapping social networks 
reduce risks imposed by asymmetric information. This argument justifies the assumption that 
controlling for everything else, work peers are more likely to join entrepreneurs in working for 
new businesses if they perceive the entrepreneurs as highly competent.  
           Thus, the positive effect of founder-employee similarity of previous workplaces may be 
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endogenous to better performance of new businesses if employees from founders’ prior 
workplaces join the new businesses when they perceive the new businesses’ success to be more 
promising.   
RESEARCH DESIGN 
              The data I use for my analyses are taken from a database called Longitudinal Integration 
Database for Health Insurance and Labor Market Studies (LISA). This database has a number of 
features that makes it suitable for research on “employee startups”: startups founded by people 
who were employees of established organizations. First, it has a wide coverage of individuals in 
Sweden: LISA presently holds annual registers since 1989 and includes all individuals 16 years 
of age and older that were registered in Sweden as of December 31 for each year. Second, LISA 
has rich information on labor market status, as it tracks the firm, industry, and region that an 
individual works in, as well as their employment status. In addition, the database has a variety of 
other individual characteristics that serve as important controls in studies of entrepreneurship 
(such as their age, educational qualifications, annual income, wealth, marital status, and number 
of children). Third, LISA is longitudinal panel data that track employees from 1989 to 2002.  It 
allows me to examine the causal mechanisms that explain the process of individuals’ transitions 
into entrepreneurship, rather than just observing a snapshot of the phenomena or describing a 
correlation between entrepreneurship and explanatory factors. Finally, LISA is a matched 
employer-employee database, which allows me to identify which individuals work in same 
establishments. The matched employer-employee feature, combined with the panel data feature 
that track individuals’ career histories, makes it possible to examine how former entrepreneurs 
affect their work peers’ transitions into entrepreneurship. 
Sample 
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             I construct the sample for my analysis based on LISA. The research design for my study 
must allow me to observe (1) individual career histories prior to current employment in 
established organizations, (2) employees’ transitions into entrepreneurship, and (3) the 
employees that entrepreneurs hire for their new businesses. Because I want to trace employees 
back five years from the current employment, I choose 1995 as the earliest possible founding 
year of a new business. Because I want to follow new businesses for long enough to observe how 
and when they hire employees, I choose 1997 as the latest possible founding year. These 
decisions lead to a sample of 4 cohorts of new businesses (1995, 1996, and 1997) which are at 
risk of hiring employees between 1995 and 2002. I restricted the sample of new firms to be 
independent new firms founded by solo entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial teams, because my 
theoretical focus is on entrepreneurial founders and their employees. Franchises, which on 
average have much more employees, are excluded from my sample.  
               For each new business, I use the matched employer-employee data to find information 
on (1) the employment histories of entrepreneurial founders and their employees, (2) 
characteristics of previous workplaces for employers and employees, and (3) properties of the 
industries where founders’ previous workplaces and the new firms are located. I made a further 
restriction of the sample of new firms based on the number of self-employed people and the 
number of employees. Both of the two variables are highly negatively skewed because 99.9% 
new firms have less than 5 self-employed people and 0.1% of new firms have more than 5 self-
employed, and 99.5% of new firms have 20 or less than 20 employees and 0.5% of new firms 
have 20 to 115 employees. Including the extremely large new businesses makes computation of 
the similarity variables for each pair of entrepreneur-employee cumbersome. Thus, I restricted 
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the sample to new businesses that have 1-5 self-employed and 0-20 employees. New firms that 
do not have any employees are included for comparison purposes.   
Measures 
Dependent Variable 
            Profit/Deficit: the difference between revenue and all expenses (Other two possible 
performance measures are survival time and firm growth in employment).   
Independent Variables 
            Employment Status: I follow previous research using similar datasets to measure an 
individual’s employment status relying on a work status classification scheme that differentiates 
a variety of labor force attachments: (1) employment with organizations, (2) unemployment, (3) 
not in the labor force, and (4) self-employment. An individual is recognized as an employee 
when his labor force status is employment with organizations. Statistics Sweden recognizes both 
unincorporated self-employment and incorporated self-employment.8 Founders of incorporated 
ventures appeared as employees whereas the incorporated ventures appeared as employers. 
However, I treated individuals who were founders of incorporated ventures as entrepreneurs, 
self-employed in incorporated firms. Unlike Nanda and Sørensen (2010) treating employees 
working for new firms that have less than 3 employees as entrepreneurs, I only define self-
employed people as entrepreneurs because the jobs that employees have in newly founded small 
firms are still wage jobs, which are fundamentally different than founding one’s own new 
business.              
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The data is based both on the statement of income to be provided to tax authorities for all 
persons who received remuneration or other benefits from employers and the data on declared 
income of active trade.  
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            Same Workplace, measured by whether a firm includes at least one pair of self-employed 
and employee from the same workplace before they join in a new business. It is important to note 
that new firms make the first hire in different years. It is possible that there will be a time lag 
between the time when an entrepreneur was working for an establishment and when the 
employee was working for an establishment, if an employee is hired not in the founding year of a 
new business, for example, an entrepreneur left an establishment in 1995 to create a new 
business, he/she hired someone from the same establishment in 1997. More than 80% of new 
businesses have one employee, so the measure I am using --   whether a firm includes at least one 
pair of self-employed and employee from the same workplace before they join in a new business 
– capture the sharing status of entrepreneur(s) and employee(s) for most new businesses.  
            Similarity of Entrepreneurial founders’ and employees’ workplaces: is measured by 
four indicators.  
           Industry Similarity: this variable is coded based on the 5-digit SIC industry code. There 
are three industries of my interest: the industry where a former entrepreneur created his/her 
startup, the industry where the current workplace is established, and the industry where an 
employee starts his/her new business. I examine the similarity of any pair of the three industries, 
which is measured by an ordinal variable ranged from 0 to 5, indicating whether the two 
businesses are in same industry in the 1st, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, or 1-5 industry code. For example, the 
extent of similarity of the two industry codes, 50202 and 50203 (50202 Bodywork repair, 
painting and glazing of motor vehicles, 50203 Installation and repair of electrical motor vehicle 
equipment ) would be 4; and the extent of similarity of the two industry codes 50202 and 50301 
(Wholesale of motor vehicle parts and accessories) would be 2.  
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          Similarity of firm size: the difference between the number of employees in an 
entrepreneur’s former workplace and the number of employees in an employee’s former 
workplace.  
          Similarity of firm age: the time difference between the founding year of an entrepreneur’s 
former workplace and the founding year of employees in an employee’s former workplace. 
Because the time frame of the LISA data are from 1989 onwards, I could not be able to identify 
firms’ founding years when they were founded in 1989 or before. So I also included a variable 
“founding in 1989 or before” to handle the left-censored variable of similarity of founding year.          
          Similarity of gender diversity: the difference between the percentage of women employees 
in an entrepreneur’s prior workplace and the percentage of women employees in an employee’s 
prior workplaces. 
          For all the four similarity variables, I first construct them for each entrepreneur-employee 
pair. For the three variables, similarity of size, age, gender diversity, their values can be negative 
or positive. Because I am interested in “similarity” rather than “directional difference”, for each 
similarity variable at team level, I take the average of the absolute values of entrepreneur-
employee pairs. For example, if a new firm has an entrepreneur and 2 employee, the similarity of 
firm size is -5 and 10 for the entrepreneur and the two employees. I then average the absolute 
values (5+10)/2=7.5 to get a measure for the new firm. The interpretation is that on average 
employees of this new firm are from established organizations that are about 7 years younger or 
older than the entrepreneur’s workplaces. Entrepreneurs and their employees are from 
workplaces of similar age when the value for this variable is smaller.  
Control Variables 
             I control for firm-level variables.  
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             Firm-level control variables: founding year of a new business, the number of employees, 
the percentage of female employees; County fixed effects. 
Analytical Strategies   
             I use a generalized mixed-effect model for a continuous dependent variable to analyze 
the effects of independent variables on new firms’ performance (Mixed-Effects Models). The 
first-level unit is a firm-year observation and the second-level unit is a firm. Correlated errors are 
included for each cluster of firm-year observations.  
            The Linear Mixed Model is a generalization of the linear model and is represented as: 
            𝑌! = 𝑋!𝛽 + 𝑍!𝛾! + 𝜀! 
Where 𝑋! and 𝑍! are fixed and random design matrices, respectively, 𝛽 is a vector of unknown 
fixed effects, 𝛾! is a vector of unknown random effects and  𝜀! is the unknown random error. I 
assume that the random effects are normally distributed with 𝐸 𝛾𝜀 = 00       𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝛾𝜀 = 𝐺 00 𝑅  
I choose Autoregressive (1) as the covariance structure, 𝜎!" = 𝜎!𝜌|!!!|,  𝜎!" = 𝜎! 1 𝜌 𝜌!𝜌 1 𝜌𝜌! 𝜌 1  
,because the AR(1) structure has homogeneous variances and correlations that decline 
exponentially with distance. In my case this means that the variability in profit/deficit is constant 
regardless of when I measure it. It also means that two firm-year observations that are right next 
to each other in time have stronger correlations (depending on the value of ρ) than firm-year 
observations that are further from each other, for example, a firm’s profit in 1995 would be 
strongly correlated with its profit in 1996 but would be less strongly correlated with its profit in 
later years.  
RESULTS 
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             In the results section, I first describe where new businesses’ employees are from, I then 
present results showing the consequences of entrepreneur and employees’ workplaces similarity 
for new businesses.  
Descriptive Results 
              Even though some scholars have claimed that new businesses create most new jobs, my 
data show that most new jobs are created by a small proportion of new businesses and the 
majority of new businesses do not have any employees in their founding year. In Figure 1, I 
show the percentiles of the number of employees hired by new businesses created in 1995, 1996, 
or 1997 in Sweden. In the first year, less than one third of new businesses hired employees.  
Until the 5th year, about half of new businesses do not have any employees. But the trajectories 
of employment growth shows that some new businesses hire more employees in subsequent 
years so that about one third of new businesses hire more than 5 employees from the third year.                      
            Among employees of new businesses, about half of them were working in very different 
industries before they joined in the new businesses. Figure 2 shows the time-dependent patterns 
of the percentages of employees from the founders’ prior workplaces or industries similar to 
founders’ prior workplaces. I first examine whether employees are from the founders’ prior 
workplaces. I then examine the heterogeneity of employees’ prior workplaces based on their 
industries, when employees are not from founders’ prior workplaces. The X axis is the similarity 
of entrepreneurs’ and employees’ workplaces. In Figure 1, the further on the right of the X axis, 
the more similar entrepreneurs’ and employees’ workplaces are. At employee level, 40% of 
employees hired by new firms in the founding year are from the founders’ prior workplaces. 
However, the number decreases over time as new business mature. For example, the percentage 
of employees hired from founders' own former workplaces is 28%, 12%, and less than 10% for 
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the 2nd year, 3rd year, and after 3rd year. Meanwhile, the percentage of employees hired from 
industries different than the founders’ prior industries increases as new firms age.   
           When employees of new businesses are not from the founders’ workplaces, they are 
mostly from similar organizations. For example, in Figure 3, about 75% of employees worked 
for organizations that were founded in years close to the founding years of the founders’ prior 
workplaces. Similarly, about 60% of employees are from organizations of similar sizes of the 
founders’ prior workplaces (Figure 4). I also found the similarity of the entrepreneurs’ and their 
employee’s prior workplaces in the percentage of women employees, as presented in Figure 5. 
            Additional descriptive results for all variables of interest are presented in Table 1, 
comparing new firms that have at least one employee and firms that do not have any employees. 
The average annual profit for firms that have employees is about $ 23,000, a little less than twice 
the average annual profit for firms that do not have any employees. Entrepreneurs of firms that 
have employees worked in industries similar to the current new businesses’ industries, compared 
to entrepreneurs of firms without any employees. Another interesting comparison of the two 
types of new businesses is that the average age of people in new firms that have employees are 
33, but the average age of people in new firms that do not have employees are 44. This age gap 
may be caused by the fact that employees hired by new firms are younger than entrepreneurs, 
assuming that entrepreneurs of the two types of firms are at similar ages. This may explain the 
large percentages of employees hired by new firms from very different industries. It is possible 
that people tend to work in a variety of industries when they are younger. Finally, the vast 
majority of new businesses in the sample are in finance & business and education & health 
industries.  
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            Among firms that have at least one employee, employees’ prior industries are more 
similar to the new businesses’ industries than entrepreneurs’. The number of female employees is 
almost same as the number of male employees in new firms. About half of employees of new 
firms are women, confirming previous findings that the labor participation rate of Swedish 
women is quite high, nearly as same as the labor participation rate of their male counterparts.  
Model Results 
             Drawing on a genealogy perspective and learning theories, I have argued that several 
conditions matter substantially for the extent to which locally optimal solutions can be achieved 
to build routines in new firms. The first set of conditions concerns the extent to which 
entrepreneurial founders recruit employees with whom they can collectively build and enact 
routines. The second set of conditions concerns the extent to which members’ workplaces and 
the new firms are under somewhat homogeneous environments (Becker 2004; Hill and Hwang 
2006; Kogut and Zander 1992; Kogut and Zander 1993). In my analysis, I test the effects of the 
two similarity variables -- the level of industry similarity between entrepreneurs’ prior workplace 
and the new business, and the level of industry similarity between employees’ prior workplace 
and the new business -- on new firms’ profit. Results from a linear mixed effects model show 
that whether employees are from industries similar to the industries of founders’ prior 
workplaces does not affect a new business’ performance. However, new firms started by 
entrepreneurs who worked in similar industries tend to have better profit. The industry similarity 
variable has a range of 0 to 6. A new firm’s profit would increase by $ 1,500 as the level of 
industry similarity increases by one. Compared to new businesses created by entrepreneurs who 
entered into a completely different industry to launch startup activities, new businesses created 
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by entrepreneurs who were employed in the same industries of their new businesses would make 
$ 90,000 more every year.  
               In addition to the key variables of interest, Model 1 also shows positive effects of 
several control variables. For example, with regard to employment size, new firms earn $1,000 
more profit as the number of employees increases by one. Compared to employment size, the 
size of an entrepreneurial team has a much larger effect on new firms’ profit. Each addition of an 
entrepreneur increases a new firm’s profit by $ 8,768.  The two dummy variables that compare 
the cohort 1995, 1996 and the cohort 1997 are not significant, showing that new firms created in 
1997 earned more or less the same profit as the two younger cohorts.    
             In Model 2, I add four similarity variables concerning the similarities of entrepreneurs’ 
and employees’ prior workplaces to Model 1 to test if entrepreneurs and their employees from 
similar workplaces are more likely to create new firms with better profit. Among the four 
similarity variables, the effect of the percentage of women employees is not statistically 
significant, and the effect of similarity in firm size is statistically but not substantially significant. 
However, a new firm makes more profit if entrepreneurs and employees’ prior workplaces were 
founded in similar time. In particular, a new firm’s profit increases by $615 if the time gap 
between entrepreneurs’ and employees’ prior workplaces’ founding years increases by one year. 
This finding suggests that founders and employees who worked for firms of similar ages are 
more likely to share similar knowledge and information about organizations. Surprisingly, new 
firms tend to make less profit when entrepreneurs and employees worked in similar industries. In 
particular, a new firm’s profit decreases by $ 1,094 as the level of industry similarity increases 
by one. I suspect that new firms may benefit from diverse knowledge that founders and 
employees bring to the new work setting.   
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             In Model 3, I add the two-way interactions of the level of industry similarity between 
entrepreneurs’ prior workplace and the new business and three variables concerning similarities 
of entrepreneurs’ and employees’ prior workplaces. I found that the positive effect of 
entrepreneur’s prior industry experience on new firms’ performance becomes smaller when the 
time gap between entrepreneurs’ and employees’ prior workplaces’ founding years is larger. I 
suspect that when entrepreneurs and employees are from establishments founded in similar time, 
employees’ knowledge about creating new businesses may substitute for the entrepreneurs’ and 
lead to the smaller effects of entrepreneurs’ knowledge on the new firms’ performance. In other 
words, a smaller time gap between entrepreneurs’ and employees’ prior workplaces’ founding 
years leads to an increased redundancy of an employee’s and an entrepreneur’s knowledge about 
organizations.  
Discussion and Conclusion  
             In this chapter, I investigate how founders and their recruited employees jointly create 
new businesses, contingent on the founding context of new businesses. I argue that an important 
dimension of developing routines and delineating boundaries is manifest in entrepreneurs’ 
selections of employees from their local labor markets (Scott 2008). Once recruited, employees 
join the founders to create new organizations and exert influences on organizations’ structures 
and performances. Even though entrepreneurs largely follow the blueprints they learned from 
prior employer organizations to recruit employees, the effects of transferring routines may be 
contingent on the founding conditions surrounding the new businesses.  
            I proposed that several conditions matter substantially for the extent to which locally 
optimal solutions can be achieved to build routines in new firms. The first set of conditions 
concerns the extent to which entrepreneurial founders recruit employees with whom they can 
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collectively build and enact routines. I propose that a new business’ performance is the best, 
secondary, and lowest, when founders and employees are from the same prior workplaces, 
similar workplaces and workplaces that are very different. The second set of conditions concerns 
the extent to which members’ workplaces and the new firms are under somewhat homogeneous 
environments (Becker 2004; Hill and Hwang 2006; Kogut and Zander 1992; Kogut and Zander 
1993). Nascent entrepreneurs would benefit the most when they attempt to start businesses in 
industries where they already have a substantial depth of experience. Similarly, employees’ prior 
industry experience may also increase new firms’ performance.   
           I found mixed results for the hypotheses. New firms do benefit significantly from large 
employment size, and new firms started by entrepreneurs who worked in similar industries tend 
to have better profit. However, whether employees are from same industry does not affect a new 
business’ performance. Furthermore, a new firm makes more profit if entrepreneurs and 
employees’ prior workplaces were founded in similar time. The interaction effects of founders’ 
prior industry experience and the similarities of founders’ and employees’ workplaces suggest 
that new firms benefit less from founders’ prior industry experience if founders and employees 
are from employer organizations that were founded in similar time. My analysis provides a 
finding that has been under theorized in my framework. I have emphasized the importance of 
founder-employee’s share of workplace attributes for building new businesses’ routines, but my 
results suggest that if founders and employees have worked in different industries, a new firm 
actually has more profit.  
          A limitation of this chapter is that some results may be sensitive to the measures I used. 
New firms have tremendous heterogeneities in performances, the number of employees, and 
founders and employees’ prior industry experiences. Most variables are highly negatively 
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skewed. Further analysis needs to be done to find which measures fit the models best and the 
extent to which the results are robust.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Results of New Firms in Sweden founded in 1995, 1996, or 1997 
Variable Median Mean Std  Median Mean Std  
  Firms Have Employees Firms Have No 
Employees 
Profit/Loss (U.S. dollor, 1,000) 13.80 22.95 151.17 11.73 13.15 346.90 
Similarity of Entrepreneurs' and 
Employees' Prior Workplaces 
      Percentage of Female Employees 0.00 0.09 0.17 -- -- -- 
Workplace Size 0.00 2836 9438 -- -- -- 
Workplace Age 0.00 0.32 1.26 -- -- -- 
Industry 0.00 0.44 1.22 -- -- -- 
From Similar Industry 
      Entrepreneurs 0.00 0.60 1.41 0.00 0.10 0.59 
Employees 0.00 1.63 2.25 
    # of Employees having Startup Exp   1.00 1.03 0.90 -- -- -- 
Workplace Demographics 
       # of Female Employees  1.00 0.57 0.50 -- -- -- 
 # of Male Employees  1.00 0.58 0.49 -- -- -- 
 # of Employees  1.00 1.14 0.35 -- -- -- 
Percent of Female Employees 0.50 0.49 0.46 -- -- -- 
 Avg. Age of People  33.00 34.98 11.53 44.00 44.17 11.74 
Number of Entrepreneurs 1.00 1.26 0.73 1.00 1.09 0.39 
 Industry Type of Employer Firm  
       Agriculture & Fishing  3 5 
 Manufacture   4   4  
 Construction   1   1  
 Wholesale   4   3  
 Finance & Business   72   64  
 Education & Health   11   14  
 Other Service   5   9  
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Figure 1. 
 
Figure	  2.	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Figure	  3.	  
	  
Figure	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Figure	  5.	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Table 2. Results from Mixed Models for New Firms' Profit/Deficit - New Firms in Sweden founded in 1995, 
1996, or 1997 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Effect Estimate P Estimate P Estimate P 
Intercept 6.789 <.0001 6.677 <.0001 6.447 <.0001 
From Similar Industry (0.734) 
 
(0.734) 
 
(0.737) 
 Entrepreneurs 1.540 <.0001 1.636 <.0001 3.413 <.0001 
 
(0.161) 
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.543) 
 Employees -0.075 0.5497 0.011 0.9305 0.075 0.5888 
 
(0.125) 
 
(0.128) 
 
(0.138) 
 Similarity of Entrepreneurs' and Employees' 
Prior Workplaces       Percentage of Female Employees 
  
-0.010 0.5869 -0.011 0.5488 
   
(0.018) 
 
(0.018) 
 Workplace Size 
  
0.000 0.0174 0.000 0.0004 
   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 Workplace Age 
  
0.615 0.0113 0.561 0.0215 
   
(0.243) 
 
(0.244) 
 Industry 
  
-1.094 <.0001 -0.751 0.0201 
Interaction of the Simi of Ent's prior ind and 
current ind and the Simi of Ent and Employees' 
prior workplaces 
  
(0.247) 
 
(0.323) 
 
      Workplace Size 
    
0.000 0.0085 
     
(0.000) 
 Workplace Age 
    
-0.038 0.0014 
     
(0.012) 
 Industry 
    
-0.104 0.1983 
     
(0.081) 
 # of Employees  1.058 0.0006 1.072 0.0012 0.998 0.0029 
 
(0.308) 
 
(0.332) 
 
(0.335) 
 Avg. Age of People  0.028 0.0116 0.030 0.0059 0.037 0.0009 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
 Number of Entrepreneurs 8.768 <.0001 8.768 <.0001 8.727 <.0001 
Founding Year ( Ref= 1997) (0.356) 
 
(0.356) 
 
(0.356) 
 1995 0.088 0.8149 0.085 0.82 0.082 0.8275 
 
(0.375) 
 
(0.375) 
 
(0.375) 
 1996 -0.449 0.2411 -0.447 0.2429 -0.455 0.2346 
 Industry Type of Employer Firm (Ref= Other 
Services)  
(0.383) 
 
(0.383) 
 
(0.383) 
  Construction  -5.292 <.0001 -5.318 <.0001 -5.339 <.0001 
 
(0.956) 
 
(0.956) 
 
(0.956) 
 Wholesale  -3.571 <.0001 -3.587 <.0001 -3.613 <.0001 
 
(0.623) 
 
(0.623) 
 
(0.623) 
 Finance & Business  2.816 <.0001 2.808 <.0001 2.779 <.0001 
 
(0.394) 
 
(0.394) 
 
(0.394) 
 Education & Health  -0.244 0.6019 -0.258 0.581 -0.274 0.5575 
 
(0.467) 
 
(0.467) 
 
(0.467) 
 -2 Res Log Likelihood 627998.2 
 
627993.4 
 
628003.2 
 Obs 72140  72140  72140  
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